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INTRODUCTION 
We are grateful to the Executive Committee of the Association of American 
Law Schools (AALS) Section on Torts and Compensation Systems, and to Michael 
Rustad in particular, for organizing the event that gave rise to this exchange. We 
are equally grateful to Christopher Robinette for playing the lead role in converting 
the event into a publication. And we are grateful most of all to Judges Guido 
Calabresi and Richard Posner, and to Professors Martha Chamallas, Robinette, and 
Rustad, for taking the time to comment on our work. 
Of course, attention comes with strings attached. Indeed, readers will not fail to 
notice that the bulk of the comments contained in this volume are quite critical. 
Several commentators suggest that our attempt to characterize tort as a law of civil 
recourse is presumptuous and reductionistic. Some argue that, in attempting to 
explain everything, we have managed to say nothing at all. Others accuse us of 
having an ivory-tower view that is blind to how tort law really works, and that 
conceals the degree to which tort law deserves criticism. 
Predictably, we believe that our commentators have misunderstood our work. 
Some of the responsibility lies with us. We have published a slew of articles on 
topics in tort theory and tort law. Some are long and contain many moving parts. 
We stand by what we have written and believe that, where our analysis has been 
complex, the subject matter has demanded it. Still, we owe interested readers a 
more digestible overall account. We have made one effort in that direction with a 
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primer aimed at law students and non-specialist readers.1 Another effort, directed to 
academics, is underway. 
Taking this as an occasion to assist readers in understanding what we have and 
have not said, we begin by offering a brief overview of civil recourse theory. We 
then respond to criticisms. We acknowledge the self-referential nature of the 
present undertaking. By way of justification, we plead self-defense. Having been 
accused, among other things, of failing to say anything useful about torts, we are 
entitled to respond by identifying what we take to be the useful things that we have 
said. 
I. CIVIL RECOURSE THEORY IN A NUTSHELL 
Our work on tort law begins with a longstanding and familiar set of social and 
legal practices and their attendant discourses. Lawyers and lawmakers treat tort law 
as a separate division of the law; one that stands apart from contract and criminal 
law. Law students learn “Torts” from materials that tend to include a set of 
canonical cases, problems, and concepts. In resolving certain kinds of disputes, 
judges apply what they understand to be tort doctrine. Lawmakers and 
policymakers debate whether and how to engage in tort reform. 
Against this backdrop, our writings have aimed to capture what it means for a 
person or entity to commit a tort, which in turn requires an analysis of the myriad 
doctrines that make up tort law. This is why our work is heavily doctrinal. We write 
about cases—some famous, some unfamiliar, some old, some new—to gain a better 
understanding of how courts, the primary articulators of tort law, define and deploy 
particular tort concepts and doctrines. In turn, we hope to locate certain general 
features that are constant across tort law, while at the same time relying on our 
understanding of these general features to improve our understanding of particular 
cases, concepts, and doctrines. 
For example, as it has been fashioned by the courts, the tort of fraud includes an 
actual reliance element. One could imagine a body of law that omitted that element 
and instead required only proof that the defendant’s misrepresentation caused harm 
to the plaintiff, whether by reliance or some other means. What does this tell us 
about the wrong of fraud? What does this tell us about torts? Quite a lot, in fact.2 
Our work also has sought to identify connections between tort concepts and the 
institutions and practices that are characteristic of tort law as it functions day-to-
day. In particular, we argue that the concept of a tort fits very naturally with the 
idea of having a court system that is open to hearing complaints that are filed at the 
discretion of a putative victim of injurious wrongdoing and that seek relief as 
against a wrongdoer. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO 
U.S. LAW: TORTS (2010). 
 2. John C. P. Goldberg, Anthony J. Sebok & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Place of 
Reliance in Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1001 (2006); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, 
and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 18–21 (1998). Today, of course, 
there are statutory claims for consumer fraud that do not include a reliance element. See 
Goldberg, Sebok & Zipursky, supra, at 1017. 
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Even from this thumbnail description, one can see that the enterprise of civil 
recourse theory contrasts with other ways of theorizing. Most obviously, it is 
distinct from the sort of prescriptive or instrumental theory that aims to design rules 
of conduct and liability in order to achieve a specified goal or set of goals. (For 
example, a relentlessly prescriptive theory with a redistributive bent might set for 
itself the task of devising a scheme of liability for injuries that best promises to 
achieve a just distribution of wealth.) Interpretive theory is also obviously a quite 
different undertaking from empirical social science. Our task has not been to collect 
or sift through data on verdicts or settlements to see what it might reveal about the 
operation of tort law. 
In noting these differences, we do not mean to suggest that the different modes 
of theorizing exist in isolation from one other. Quite the opposite, we have 
emphasized that the answers to the sort of interpretive questions we pursue have 
potentially significant implications for prescriptive analysis.3 Likewise, empirical 
social science findings can inform both interpretive and prescriptive analysis. 
Turning from method to substance, we claim that Anglo-American tort law is 
best understood in terms of three interlocking ideas.4 First, torts are wrongs, albeit 
wrongs of a special genus. They are wrongs in that each tort stems from a norm of 
conduct that enjoins us not to interfere with the well-being of others in certain 
ways, or to act for their benefit in certain ways. Beyond this, torts are legal wrongs: 
for a wrong to be a tort it must be recognized as such in the law. Its counting as a 
moral wrong is neither necessary nor sufficient for it to be a legal wrong. To say 
the same thing, the norm enjoining conduct is a legally authoritative directive or 
rule, even if a directive or rule only implicit in precedent. 
Within the category of legal wrongs, torts are further distinguished because tort 
law’s directives are defined by law rather than by agreement—a familiar way of 
dividing tort and contract.5 Torts are also distinctive as legal wrongs in that they are 
injury-inclusive and relational wrongs. Absent an injury to someone, there is no 
tort, and even where there is an injury connected to wrongful conduct, there is still 
no tort unless the conduct was not merely wrongful in a generic sense, but wrongful 
as to the injury victim. Take the tort of negligence, for example. Negligence is a 
legal, non-agreement-based, injury-inclusive, relational wrong because, at least as 
applied to physical harms, court decisions have defined the directive contained 
within it as follows: for any person whom one might expect to injure physically 
were one to act carelessly toward him or her, one must not physically injure such a 
person by acting carelessly toward him or her. 
Our interpretive claim that torts are a special kind of wrong has left us with 
several challenges. We have had to establish that the attributes we specify to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 3. See, e.g., John C. P. Goldberg, What Are We Reforming? Tort Theory’s Place in 
Debates over Malpractice Reform, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1075 (2006). 
 4. The remainder of this section relies on GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 1, at 1–5, 
and John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights and Responsibility in the Law of 
Torts, in RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAW 251 (Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson eds., 2012). 
 5. The principle of civil recourse, we maintain, is a principle of private law, not just 
tort law. Thus, contract law also instantiates the principle of civil recourse, though on 
different terms than tort. John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse 
Revisited, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 341, 349 (2011). 
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capture the distinctiveness of tortious wrongdoing—especially injury-inclusiveness 
and relationality—really can be found in courts’ definitions of the different torts.6 
Furthermore, it has been our burden to defend the claim that all torts are cogently 
described as wrongs, including torts that have “strict liability” aspects, such as 
trespass to land, products liability, and even negligence (in its use of the objective 
standard of care).7 Much of our writing on tort law has been an effort to meet these 
burdens. 
Second, civil recourse theory identifies as critical to tort law a particular linkage 
between the wrongs of tort law and the idea of a right of action. The commission of 
a tort confers on the victim a particular legal power; namely, a power to demand 
and (if certain conditions are met) to obtain responsive action from the tortfeasor.8 
A legal liability is the Hohfeldian flipside of this kind of legal power. The 
commission of a tort leaves a tortfeasor vulnerable to a claim initiated by the victim 
and backed by the power of the state. Because the vulnerability is to the victim, the 
wrongdoer’s fate is, to a substantial degree, in the victim’s hands. The victim, not a 
government official, decides whether to press her claim or not, and the victim, in 
principle, also decides whether to accept a resolution of the claim short of 
judgment. If the claim is successful, of course, the victim can enlist the state’s aid 
in her effort to enjoin ongoing wrongful conduct or to demand responsive action 
from the wrongdoer in recognition of the wrong done to her. 
Thus, a core and distinctive feature of our account of tort law is its emphasis on 
the way in which tort law connects the commission of wrongs to the recognition of 
rights of action. The courts’ having defined torts as a particular kind of wrong and 
their having seen fit to confer rights of action on victims of such wrongs is not 
purely coincidental. The idea of a relational, injurious wrong goes quite naturally 
with the idea of the victim being entitled to respond to the wrongdoer. Nor is it 
purely coincidental that courts and legislatures have seen fit to establish this body 
of law. For the provision of tort law (or other bodies of law similarly recognizing 
wrongdoer accountability to victims of wrongs) is itself a kind of political duty that 
the state owes its citizens.9 
Following Locke and others, we have suggested that this duty is rooted in a 
natural privilege of individuals to respond to wrongdoing.10 Insofar as individuals 
delegate such privileges to governments, and insofar as governments justifiably 
deny individuals privileges of self-help and self-assertion in the name of civil peace 
and justice, it becomes government’s duty to provide alternatives. Tort law is, in 
the first instance, a fulfillment of that duty (though in fulfilling this duty, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 6. John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 
1625 (2002) (on the injury requirement); Zipursky, supra note 2 (arguing that all torts have a 
“substantive standing” rule that requires the plaintiff to prove a wrong to her rather than 
generically wrongful conduct). 
 7. John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 
917, 947–53 (2010). 
 8. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 4, at 265–66. 
 9. Id. at 268–69. 
 10. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 623, 637–40 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 
2002). 
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government may also accomplish other things). By granting to individuals who 
have been injuriously wronged a legal power to exact a remedy from the wrongdoer 
through the courts, government complies with the principle of civil recourse—the 
principle that a person who is wronged, but deprived by law of the ability to 
respond directly, is entitled to an avenue of civil recourse against the wrongdoer.11 
Tort law’s linkage of wrongs to rights of action has been a focal point of our 
efforts to explain why other theories of tort distort the law that they purport to be 
faithfully interpreting. Thus, we have argued that recognition of the centrality of 
rights of action to tort creates insurmountable difficulties for corrective justice 
theories that treat tort liability as enforcing a moral duty of repair owed by a 
wrongdoer to his or her victim.12 More saliently in the present context, we have 
maintained that attention to wrongs and rights of action exposes as fallacious the 
overwhelming tendency of modern academics—whether high priests of law and 
economics or more grounded compensation-and-deterrence scholars—to treat tort 
law as just another instance of government regulation.13 Tort law often does 
provide some compensation to those who have suffered losses, and the prospect of 
tort liability can and probably often does discourage actors from engaging in 
tortious conduct. But it hardly follows that tort law is just regulatory law, or that 
compensation and deterrence are the central aims of tort law. In providing tort law, 
government is not interacting with citizens as a regulator. It is providing a forum 
for hearing and adjudicating complaints about violations of certain norms of 
conduct that govern interactions between persons and enforcing decisions rendered 
in those adjudications. 
As with respect to our claim that torts are a special kind of wrong, when it 
comes to rights of action we have faced a number of challenges. It is on us to 
explain why courts have chosen to recognize immunities and other defenses that 
deprive certain victims of civil recourse,14 why the right to obtain responsive action 
from a tortfeasor is conditioned procedurally in the ways that it is,15 and why the 
right has the constitutional status that the Supreme Court has haltingly 
recognized.16 Likewise, we are left to explain why persons who have not 
themselves been wronged—for example, spouses of tort victims—are sometimes 
permitted rights of action.17 And we must distinguish instances in which bodies of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. Zipursky, supra note 2, at 82–83. 
 12. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695 
(2003). 
 13. See, e.g., John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from the 
Internal Point of View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563, 1575–
76 (2006) (noting that tort concepts do not fit comfortably with a conception of tort law as 
regulatory law). 
 14. See, e.g., GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 1, at 178–83 (briefly suggesting that 
certain governmental immunities are best defended, if at all, on separation-of-powers 
grounds). 
 15. See id. at 65–66 (alluding to possible justifications for recognizing procedural 
hurdles of the sort tort plaintiffs encounter). 
 16. John C. P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the 
Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005). 
 17. Zipursky, supra note 2, at 37–38. 
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law other than tort law confer rights of action because the government is trying to 
accomplish something other than providing an avenue of recourse to victims of 
relational, injurious wrongs.18 
The third level at which our theory operates is at the level of remedies. Civil 
recourse theory asserts that the question of remedy in a tort case turns on the 
question of what a person who has proven that she has been wronged is entitled to 
demand of the person or entity that wronged her. This, we insist, is a question apart 
from the question of what sort of response the defendant is obligated to make.19 As 
noted above, tort law, in our view, is not the recognition in law of the tortfeasor’s 
duty of repair. It is about the victim’s right to redress. 
To be sure, in modern practice, tort damages are often described as geared to the 
task of making the plaintiff whole, a fact that has misled scholars of various stripes 
to suppose that tort law is all about making whole or restoring the status quo ante. 
We argue instead that “making whole” is but one remedial rule, albeit one that is in 
many instances a perfectly reasonable one to adopt. It is not part of the very 
definition of tort. Rather, it reflects a judgment regarding what constitutes fair and 
reasonable redress to the victim of a tortious wrong. On our account, a successful 
tort plaintiff is entitled to redress. Redress is a capacious (though not empty) 
concept that is compatible with judicial provision of remedies ranging from 
injunctions to nominal damages. This is why the civil recourse account can address 
pressing contemporary questions about punitive and noneconomic damages more 
satisfactorily than competitor theories.20 
Our writings have principally used civil recourse theory to understand tort law. 
We wish for better understanding of the law not only for its own sake and not only 
to enhance our ability to teach the subject. Better understanding allows for better 
decisions by those applying, evaluating, and revising the law, and for those 
ascertaining its relationship to other areas of law. And, critically, it anchors in 
reality those entertaining such proposals from theorists and ideologues across the 
political spectrum, in academia, in the courts, and in the domain of legislation. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. See Goldberg et al., supra note 2, at 1015–18. 
 19. John C. P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full 
Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435 (2006); Zipursky, supra note 2, at 88, 95–96. 
 20. John C. P. Goldberg, Tort Law for Federalists (and the Rest of Us): Private Law in 
Disguise, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 3, 4–10 (2004); John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, Convergence and Contrast in Tort Scholarship: An Essay in Honor of Robert 
Rabin, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 467, 478–96 (2012) [hereinafter Goldberg & Zipursky, 
Convergence and Contrast]; Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. 
L. REV. 105 (2005) [hereinafter Zipursky, Theory of Punitive Damages]; Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, Punitive Damages after Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 44 CT. REV. 134 (2007) 
[hereinafter Zipursky, After Philip Morris]; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive 
Damages, and Preemption, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1757, 1771–88 (2012) [hereinafter Zipursky, 
Punitive Damages and Preemption]. 
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II. CALABRESI AND POSNER 
A. Posner 
An academic adage says that it is better to be criticized than ignored. Alas it 
offers us little solace in dealing with Judge Richard Posner’s commentary, for he 
has somehow managed to criticize our work while ignoring it. The most sustained 
engagement amounts to a complaint that we once—in a footnote!—
mischaracterized a claim in one of his opinions. We had hoped for better, especially 
given that we have done Posner the courtesy of taking his work seriously.21 
1. General Criticisms 
Posner maintains that we: (1) falsely and presumptuously assume that a single 
theory can explain “all of tort law”;22 (2) bear the onus of explaining how to 
determine what counts as a wrong for purposes of tort law, yet have said nothing on 
this topic, instead relying on the idea that we all know a wrong when we see it;23 
and (3) have nothing to say about doctrines limiting liability for wrongs, and 
nothing to say about remedies.24 Each of these broad criticisms is off the mark. 
It is odd to see the coauthor of The Economic Structure of Tort Law criticize us 
for allegedly maintaining that a single theory can explain all of tort law.25 Pots and 
kettles aside, we are not guilty of the charged offense. As we have explained above, 
civil recourse theory offers a particular interpretation or characterization of the 
main doctrinal and institutional features of tort law. Quite obviously, there are other 
valuable ways to analyze tort law. Understanding how it has developed over time 
requires historical analysis, as well as, perhaps, the tools of political science. 
Understanding how tort doctrine and decisions influence the behavior of 
individuals and firms requires sociological, psychological, and economic analysis. 
Deciding which aspects of tort ought to be altered requires a combination of 
interpretive, empirical, sociological, and normative analysis. 
Posner seems inclined to fault us for claiming that civil recourse theory offers a 
better interpretive account of tort law than rival accounts. If this really is his 
complaint, he presents it in a highly misleading way when he accuses us of 
hubristically aspiring to explain all of tort law. We are interested in identifying the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. See, e.g., John C. P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 
544–48, 553–58 (2003) (summarizing Posner’s core interpretive claims about tort law and 
discussing criticisms of them); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1999, 2007–26 (2007) (identifying deficiencies in Posner’s Hand Formula conception 
of fault). 
 22. Richard A. Posner, Instrumental and Noninstrumental Theories of Tort Law, 88 IND. 
L.J. 469, 473 (2013). 
 23. Id. at 473–74. 
 24. Id. 
 25. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT 
LAW 1 (1987) (“This book explores the hypothesis that the common law of torts is best 
explained as if the judges who created the law . . . were trying to promote efficient resource 
allocation.”). 
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distinctive features of tort law. As noted above, we argue that it identifies a special 
category of wrongs and that it empowers persons who can establish that they are 
victims of such wrongs to demand, through court proceedings, responsive action 
from a wrongdoer. We further maintain that the connection between tort’s two 
sides—its particular way of defining wrongs and its provision of an avenue of 
victim recourse—is organic rather than haphazard: given the kind of wrong that 
torts are, it is entirely apt for the law that defines those wrongs to authorize victims 
to obtain redress from wrongdoers. Finally, civil recourse theory emphasizes that 
tort law’s articulation of wrongs and its provision of an avenue of recourse against 
wrongdoers is the fulfillment of a political obligation owed by government to its 
citizens. 
In developing civil recourse theory, we have, of course, had many things to say 
about substantive topics in tort law. And other scholars have invoked civil recourse 
theory in efforts to illuminate various aspects of tort and of private law more 
generally.26 We have done so because we take the view that an interpretive theory 
must be true to the law it interprets, and hence one must investigate tort law 
thoroughly to be satisfied that one’s interpretation is faithful to the materials being 
interpreted. This is a far cry from claiming—and we have never claimed—that the 
theory explains or entails tort law in all of its particulars. Civil recourse theory is 
unifying in that it treats the various facets of tort law as forming a mostly coherent 
whole, rather than a mishmash. Yet precisely because the unification takes place at 
a structural rather than substantive level, the theory is sensitive to the variety 
among tort law’s wrongs and remedies and can embrace a pluralistic approach as to 
the reasons for having tort law in the first place.27 
Having accused us of offering a theory of everything, Posner in the same breath 
claims that we have managed to say nothing. Specifically, he says that we have no 
account of how to determine what counts as a “wrong” within tort law.28 It is not 
enough, he adds, for our theory to proceed on the assumption that we all know a 
wrong when we see it. This criticism, like its predecessor, reflects a bewildering 
inattention to our writing. We have—like virtually every torts scholar—noted 
important linkages between custom, social norms, and the law of torts.29 However, 
we have never claimed or implied that there is no need for theorists to address the 
identification, description, or explanation of the wrongs recognized by tort law 
because one will know them when one sees them. 
It is true that we do not purport to deduce the content of tort law from the 
general idea of civil recourse. To accept that tort law is a law of civil recourse does 
not entail, for example, that trespass to land must be defined so as to subject 
innocent trespassers to liability, that negligence law must embrace the objective 
standard of ordinary care, or that courts must adopt comparative fault over 
                                                                                                                 
 
 26. For a useful analytic taxonomy, with citations to works employing civil recourse 
theory, see Andrew S. Gold, The Taxonomy of Civil Recourse, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 65 
(2011). 
 27. John C. P. Goldberg, Ten Half-Truths About Tort Law, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1221, 
1252–53 (2008). 
 28. Posner, supra note 22, at 474. 
 29. See, e.g., John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 
146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1831, 1840 (1998). 
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contributory negligence.30 Instead, we maintain that the theory illuminates the 
nature of tortious wrongdoing as well as features of particular torts. Again, we have 
argued, based on a close examination of case law, that all torts share certain 
attributes that distinguish tortious wrongdoing from, say, criminal wrongdoing.31 
For conduct to count as a tort it must be injurious to another, as opposed to merely 
posing a risk of injury to another. It must also be wrongful to that other, rather than 
wrongful to the world. And it must be recognized as such in authoritative sources 
of law. While obviously abstract, there is practical bite in these assertions. Indeed, 
we have argued that core tort doctrines such as the reliance requirement in fraud 
and the “of-and-concerning” requirement in libel and slander can only be 
satisfactorily explained if one recognizes that torts are relational wrongs.32 
Likewise, we have shed light on difficult causation questions by examining them 
against the backdrop of tort’s requirement that wrongs be realized in actual 
injuries.33 
If Posner is looking for our engagement with particular torts, we have done that 
too. In our writings we have argued, just to give a few examples, that: (1) the 
majority of courts have been right to reject “social host” liability claims on the 
ground that causing injury to another through a careless failure to monitor the 
alcohol intake of a competent adult should not count as negligence toward that 
other;34 (2) standard medical monitoring claims are not rightly understood as claims 
for realized or completed torts, and hence the U.S. Supreme Court was correct to 
suppose that such claims should not give rise to lump-sum damage payments;35 (3) 
the Supreme Court erred in concluding that the First Amendment forbids states 
from treating as actionable intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) a 
defendant’s exploitation of a private funeral to gain attention for his political 
message;36 (4) “loss of a chance” doctrine probably should not apply to legal 
malpractice claims;37 (5) attorney carelessness that injures non-clients should rarely 
count as legal malpractice;38 and (6) contra Holmes and Posner, the injuring of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 30. We think it is an advantage of civil recourse theory that it can explain these features 
of tort law. This is quite different from maintaining that these features are logically entailed 
by the idea of civil recourse, such that their absence would somehow render tort law no 
longer tort law. 
 31. See, e.g., Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 4, at 259–63. 
 32. Zipursky, supra note 2, at 17–21. 
 33. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 6, at 1636–59 (explaining that the courts’ 
rejection of tort liability for pure risk-creation is part and parcel of torts being defined as 
injurious wrongs). 
 34. John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Intervening Wrongdoing in Tort: The 
Restatement (Third)’s Unfortunate Embrace of Negligent Enabling, 44 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 1211, 1225–29 (2009). 
 35. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 6, at 1701–15. 
 36. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Snyder v. Phelps, Outrageousness, and the Open Texture of 
Tort Law, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 473 (2011). 
 37. John C. P. Goldberg, What Clients Are Owed: Cautionary Observations on Lawyers 
and Loss of a Chance, 52 EMORY L.J. 1201 (2003). 
 38. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Malpractice and the Structure of Negligence Law, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 649 (1998). 
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another through the failure to meet negligence law’s objective standard is cogently 
described as a wronging of that other.39 
Perhaps, in the end, what frustrates Posner is that we do not provide a 
foundational account of the nature of tortious wrongdoing. We have not claimed, as 
he has, that the essence of tortiousness is conduct that wastes scarce resources.40 
Nor have we claimed that one can derive the list of torts recognized in most U.S. 
jurisdictions from Rawls’s theory of justice, or Nozick’s, Kant’s, Locke’s, or 
Aristotle’s. We have not pursued such an account because we see no reason to 
think that one is available. We do not doubt that conduct identified as wrongful by 
plausible moral theories often will also be conduct that is tortious. Other things 
being equal, it is both immoral and tortious to punch another, to poison another, to 
trick another out of her savings, to identify falsely another as a pedophile, to botch 
a patient’s surgery or a client’s legal representation, and so on. The point is not that 
we know torts when we see them. The point is that torts have emerged and continue 
to emerge out of a process in which judges and juries face the practical task of 
deciding whether to credit complaints of alleged wrongdoing against the backdrop 
of extant tort doctrine, its animating principles, the complex circumstances of each 
case, and the institutional place in which decision makers find themselves when 
deciding these cases. Given that the wrongs of tort have been fashioned in this way, 
it would be astonishing to discover that the wrongs identified by courts and 
legislatures as torts track a single, foundational theory of what constitutes a wrong. 
One might have thought that an approach of the sort we adopt would appeal to 
Posner, the self-styled pragmatist. We have not only written about torts from within 
a pragmatist framework but have expressly connected those writings to a 
jurisprudential position that we have labeled “pragmatic conceptualism,” for which 
Cardozo serves as the poster child.41 Given that Posner’s patron saint is Holmes, 
and that Holmes and Cardozo differed fundamentally over the role of legal 
concepts in legal analysis,42 we certainly did not expect Posner to embrace fully our 
brand of pragmatism. What surprises us is Posner’s failure to appreciate that our 
approach to tort theory, like his, is pragmatic in a way that explains why it does not 
offer some sort of comprehensive, top-down, and fully complete theory of tort law. 
The most obvious display of Posner’s failure to take stock of what we have done 
is in the following passages: 
Civil recourse theory has nothing to say about limitations on redress 
except that since all that the theory requires is “some sort of redress” 
for wrongful injury, all the traditional limitations are in principle 
                                                                                                                 
 
 39. John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1124–25, 1143–63 (2007). 
 40. See Goldberg, supra note 21, at 553 (criticizing this aspect of Posner’s interpretation 
of tort law). 
 41. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 LEGAL THEORY 457, 474–78 
(2000). 
 42. John C. P. Goldberg, The Life of the Law, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1419, 1436–41, 1453–
54 (1999) (book review) (criticizing Posner’s interpretation of Cardozo’s decisions and 
methods for failing to appreciate that, in contrast to Holmes, Cardozo supposed that legal 
concepts are not empty labels). 
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acceptable; whether particular limitations are is a pragmatic issue 
outside the scope of the theory.43 
The list of “limitations” includes: 
contributory and comparative negligence, assumption of risk, causation 
and foreseeability, the economic loss rule, contribution and indemnity, 
res ipsa loquitur, punitive damages, limitations on duties to avoid 
injuries to trespassers and licensees, general damages, the choice 
between negligence and strict liability, the distinction between 
independent-contractor liability and respondeat superior, sovereign 
immunity, official immunity, contractual waivers of liability, loss of a 
chance (latent or probabilistic injury), mass torts, and constitutional 
limitations on defamation and on the tort right of privacy.44 
The assertion that we have had virtually nothing to say about limitations on redress 
is absurd. Amidst our published works, one can readily find discussions of the 
following “limitations,” as even a search of article titles would indicate: assumption 
of risk,45 causation,46 foreseeability,47 economic loss,48 contribution and 
indemnity,49 punitive damages,50 landowner liability,51 general damages,52 the 
choice between negligence and strict liability,53 loss of chance,54 mass torts,55 and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 43. Posner, supra note 22, at 474. 
 44. Id. at 473. 
 45. John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Shielding Duty: How Attending to 
Assumption of Risk, Attractive Nuisance, and Other “Quaint” Doctrines Can Improve 
Decisionmaking in Negligence Cases, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 329, 342–51 (2006). 
 46. John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Concern for Cause: A Comment on 
the Twerski-Sebok Plan for Administering Negligent Marketing Claims Against Gun 
Manufacturers, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1413–17 (2000); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 
39, at 1132–40; Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Corrective Justice in an Age of 
Mass Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 214, 221–44 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 
2001). 
 47. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 44 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1247 (2009). 
 48. John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the 
Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 664–73 (2001); Zipursky, supra 
note 2, at 30–32. 
 49. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 1, at 359–68. 
 50. See supra note 20. 
 51. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 45, at 351–59. 
 52. Goldberg, supra note 19; Goldberg & Zipursky, Convergence and Contrast, supra 
note 20, at 478–96; John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Easy Case for 
Products Liability Law: A Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell, 123 HARV. L. REV. 
1919, 1934–40 (2010); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Coming Down to Earth: Why Rights-Based 
Theories of Tort Can and Must Address Cost-Based Proposals for Damages Reform, 55 
DEPAUL L. REV. 469 (2006). 
 53. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 39, at 1149–61. 
 54. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 46; Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 6, at 1656–
60. 
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constitutional limits on liability for defamation and privacy.56 Indeed, had we 
included in this accounting the explanatory notes to our coauthored casebook and 
the book’s 500-plus page Teacher’s Manual (which we did not—even a voracious 
reader like Posner cannot be expected to read everything), we could have stated 
accurately that we have published writings on every one of the topics he listed.57 
In several of the sources just cited, we expressly discuss why economic theories 
of tort law are inadequate to explain the relevant aspects of tort law. We also have 
asserted with respect to most of these topics that instrumental accounts of the 
limitations offered by more doctrinally oriented scholars are inadequate and that 
our own approach provides a better account. Perhaps Judge Posner found no value 
in these writings. Perhaps he concluded in advance that he would find no value in 
reading them and did not read them. Regardless, his assertion that we have 
“nothing to say” about topics that we have addressed at length is stunningly off-
base. 
2. Micro-Criticisms 
One of Posner’s criticisms differs from those already canvassed because it is 
quite specific and because it has some textual support in our writings. 
After citing the work of other critics of civil recourse theory, Posner announces 
that he will add his “two cents’ worth” by noting, “as one example of erroneous 
analysis,”58 our mention in a law review article of his 2003 opinion for the Seventh 
Circuit in Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc.59 Mathias is a well-known 
decision among tort scholars. A motel knowingly rented a bed-bug infested room to 
the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs suffered bites and sued. A jury awarded each plaintiff 
$5000 in compensatory damages and $186,000 in punitive damages.60 Judge 
Posner’s opinion for the court upheld the punitive damages awards, along the way 
emphasizing the value of punitive damages in making up for the deterrence deficit 
that, in his view, attaches to wrongdoing of a sort that tends to escape detection and 
that tends to cause relatively minor harms to individual victims.61  
Here is what we said about Mathias in a 2010 article: 
                                                                                                                 
 55. Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 
CORNELL L. REV. 265 (2011); John C. P. Goldberg, Comment, Misconduct, Misfortune, and 
Just Compensation: Weinstein on Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2034 (1997); Ripstein & 
Zipursky, supra note 46. 
 56. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 1, at 307–41; John C. P. Goldberg, Judging 
Reputation: Realism and Common Law in Justice White’s Defamation Jurisprudence, 74 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1471 (2003). 
 57. JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT LAW: 
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS (3d ed. 2012); JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK & 
BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TEACHER’S MANUAL FOR TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND 
REDRESS (3d ed. 2012), available to adopters at http://www.aspenlawschool.com/books/
goldberg_tort/profMaterials.asp (copy on file with authors). 
 58. Posner, supra note 22, at 470. 
 59. 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 60. Id. at 674. 
 61. Id. at 676–77. 
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The standard “under-deterrence” explanation provided by deterrence 
theorists fails entirely to explain the rules for when punitive damages 
will be awarded . . . .220 
 
 220. See Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 
2003) (Posner, J.) (suggesting that punitive damages are awarded to induce 
plaintiffs with modest compensatory damages claims to sue, and to encourage 
litigants to uncover hidden wrongs, thereby promoting the private prosecution 
of conduct that would otherwise go unsanctioned). On this theory, one should 
never see an award of punitive damages in cases of tortious conduct causing 
substantial harms, nor should courts permit punitive damages in cases of open 
and obvious misconduct. The law allows punitive awards in both kinds of 
cases. . . .62 
Posner is unhappy with this footnote. After providing a lengthy excerpt from 
Mathias, he responds to it as follows: 
[C]ontrary to Goldberg and Zipursky’s summary, the opinion does not 
say or imply that punitive damages are awarded only in order to induce 
suits to enforce modest claims or to encourage plaintiffs “to uncover 
hidden wrongs,” and therefore that punitive damages should never be 
awarded in cases of tortious conduct that cause substantial harm or in 
cases of “open and obvious misconduct.” The summary is not only 
inaccurate, but internally inconsistent. If it were true that awards of 
punitive damages had only two possible aims, that of inducing suits to 
enforce modest claims and that of encouraging plaintiffs to uncover 
hidden wrongs, then such awards would be proper in cases of 
substantial harm caused by hidden wrongs and of modest claims even if 
they were the result of open and obvious misconduct.63 
We are grateful to at last encounter something in Posner’s attack that engages a 
claim we have actually made. True, it is an engagement with a single sentence 
contained in one footnote to a seventy-page article, but we’ll take what we can get. 
Moreover, we concede that the offending sentence, which follows the parenthetical 
description of Mathias’ reasoning, is deserving of criticism for its capsule summary 
of a claim about shortcomings in standard economic accounts of punitive damages. 
The summary suggests, incorrectly, that difficulty of detection and modest victim 
losses are both necessary conditions for the award of punitive damages on the 
economic account. We erred in constructing the offending sentence around the use 
of the “nor” conjunction—a small but not inconsequential mistake that we should 
have caught. 
In mitigation, we note that the parenthetical preceding the problematic sentence 
is both circumspect (commencing with the word “suggesting”) and avoids the 
mistake contained in the sentence that follows it. More to the point, Judge Posner 
never actually responds to the argument that is raised in the text—and that is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 62. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 7, at 961 & n.220. 
 63. Posner, supra note 22, at 472–73 (emphasis in original). 
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discussed at length in our writings on punitive damages64—as to the descriptive 
weaknesses of economic accounts of punitive damages. We return to this issue 
below.65 
3. Impact-Based Critique 
Posner seems to take some delight in pointing out that, whereas his tort 
decisions have been cited many times by other courts, our scholarly writings have 
been judicially cited infrequently.66 We are unsure what to make of this 
observation. Apparently the point is that legal scholarship needs to be assessed in 
part by its ability to assist lawyers and judges in doing their jobs, and that citation 
counts indicate that our work fails on this dimension. 
Obviously the citation of judicial decisions is a very different matter from the 
citation of scholarship, though we do not doubt that Posner’s tort scholarship has 
been more frequently cited by courts than ours. And many factors bear on citation 
counts that have nothing to do with the quality of cited scholarship or its potential 
value for legal actors. Posner insinuates that he has an explanation for our count: 
our work is unhelpful because it fails to explain the nature of tortious wrongdoing 
and the limitations on tort liability. The insinuated explanation is unpersuasive in 
light of the falsity of its premise. 
We have our own thoughts about possible explanations. We take an anti-
reductionistic approach to scholarship and adjudication. Thus, we tend to offer 
extended analyses and qualified conclusions. Likewise, we present our work as 
primarily helpful in framing, shaping, or directing analysis rather than in generating 
prefabricated results. In substance, our views do not map neatly onto to defense-
side or plaintiff-side positions in the modern tort wars. No doubt there are other 
reasons, but canvassing them here will not be a fruitful exercise. In any event, we 
are the wrong people to do it. 
Abstracting from our own case, we have long taken the view that Legal Realism 
and the “law-and- . . .” movements have had a regrettable influence on the 
interactions of judges and law professors. As legal theorists have tried to display 
with ever-greater sophistication that legal concepts are just empty labels, and that 
sound reasoning about legal problems turns instead on the application of cognitive 
psychology, economics, empirical social science, or philosophy, many judges have 
lost interest in reading what legal scholars have to say. We have endeavored to take 
the law on its own terms and to provide illumination from within it. But we can 
hardly expect the lawyers who brief cases and the judges who decide them to 
overcome their now understandable suspicion that academic analysis has nothing to 
offer them. In this climate, the fact that some judges might still find value in 
sprinkling their opinions with citations to academic “rock stars” would not be 
particularly persuasive evidence on the issue of which sort of scholarship has 
greater potential to be genuinely helpful to courts struggling to decide difficult 
legal issues. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 64. See supra note 20. 
 65. See infra text accompanying notes 71–74. 
 66. Posner, supra note 22, at 475–519. 
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In further support of his claim that the citations to our work demonstrate the 
deficiencies of the civil recourse account of tort, Posner takes advantage of his dual 
citizenship on the bench and in the academy by attesting that he finds nothing in the 
account that would help him decide cases. In a sporting gesture, however, he 
concludes his critique by inviting us to demonstrate how our work might have 
aided him in analyzing the tort cases that have come before him.67 
The challenge is probably rigged—as if Posner had said to us: “I’ll bet you $20 
that you can’t convince me to like Moby Dick.” It is also rigged in a second way. 
For whatever our misgivings about Posner’s efforts to reduce tort law to a scheme 
of efficient deterrence, we happily concede that he is a first-rate lawyer who, in 
spite of his larger theoretical commitments, tends to write very strong tort opinions. 
Posner reports that he loves tort law.68 We believe him. Indeed, as we have 
previously noted, and as Zipursky emphasized in his Prosser Award presentation at 
the 2012 AALS Tort Section Meeting, Posner stands out among his cohort of torts 
scholars for his attention to, and command of, the procedural, substantive, and 
remedial aspects of tort doctrine. Because, when writing theory, he is so keen to 
remake tort law into something that it is not, one might question whether he really 
can count as a “lover” of tort law, as opposed to a lover of a certain theoretical 
model projected onto tort law.69 But there is no doubt that, in tort, Posner “gets it.” 
To this sort of judge our work probably will not add a huge amount in terms of 
guidance on decision making in particular cases. 
Enough, though, with the qualifications. Where might our work have made a 
difference? We stand by our claim that Posner’s musings in Mathias on punitive 
damages are off base. Punitive damages are available even for highly visible 
wrongs that cause substantial losses, and, as noted above, they are unavailable in 
many instances in which they probably could promote the cause of efficient 
deterrence. The economic conception of punitive damages as making up for under-
deterrence simply does not work as a positive account of doctrine.70 
To be sure, courts have since the 1970s increasingly emphasized the value of 
punitive damages as a tool for punishing and deterring antisocial conduct.71 
However, there is a profound difference between punitive damages understood as 
victim redress and punitive damages understood as a regulatory device. 
Appreciating this difference is of vital importance not just to tort theory but to legal 
practice. As we have argued elsewhere, the U.S. Supreme Court’s wobbly but 
persistent efforts to impose due process limits on punitive damages make sense, if 
                                                                                                                 
 
 67. Id. at 525. 
 68. Id. at 486. 
 69. See John C. P. Goldberg, Unloved: Tort in the Modern Legal Academy, 55 VAND. L. 
REV. 1501, 1509–13 (2002) (offering this suggestion). 
 70. This point is accepted by leading scholars who take a more openly normative 
approach to the application of economic analysis to tort law. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky 
& Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 897–
900 (1998) (arguing that the law of punitive damages does not reflect a rational application 
of deterrence principles). 
 71. See Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages 
as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583, 603–06 (2003) 
(describing “public wrongs” conceptions of punitive damages). 
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at all, as an implicit recognition of the need for added safeguards when punitive 
damages are functioning as a form of regulation rather than as tort redress.72 In 
other words, when punitive damages are being awarded on terms that have little to 
do with an individual victim’s claim, and everything to do with the state’s interest 
in punishing and deterring antisocial conduct, there needs to be closer scrutiny of 
the system of civil litigation to ensure that it operates on terms that befit a 
regulatory scheme. To give jurors carte blanche to set an award that will serve the 
public interest—as opposed to allowing them to set an award that is fitting redress 
for the plaintiff given the defendant’s mistreatment of the plaintiff—is to engage in 
a form of regulation that is so haphazard as to deny defendants due process.73 
Because Judge Posner cannot conceive of punitive damages as anything other 
than a regulatory instrument, he cannot appreciate what underlies the Court’s due 
process decisions. Hence, in Mathias he essentially ignored the Court’s stated 
concerns about punitive damages awards vastly disproportionate to compensatory 
damage awards.74 For Posner, the existence in Mathias of an economic rationale for 
a large punitive award bolstered the case for deeming the jury’s disproportionate 
award to comport with due process. This gets the constitutional dimension of 
punitive damages law backwards. It is precisely when punitive damages are 
awarded on such an avowedly instrumental rationale that they must be subjected to 
more exacting scrutiny and tighter substantive limits. Had Posner attended to our 
writings on punitive damages, he might have recognized that his stated reasons for 
upholding the jury’s punitive award in Mathias in fact cut against his conclusion 
that the award comported with due process.  
Our casebook includes several Posner opinions as principal cases or cases 
highlighted prominently in notes.75 One of them is Beul v. ASSE International, 
Inc.76 It concerned the failure of a non-profit that places foreign exchange students 
with U.S. host families to check properly on the placement of a sixteen-year-old 
girl named Kristin Beul. Kristin was physically coerced and emotionally 
manipulated by Richard Bruce, the father of the host family, into an ongoing sexual 
relationship that eventually left her shattered.77 
                                                                                                                 
 
 72. See, e.g., Zipursky, Punitive Damages and Preemption, supra note 20, at 1777–84. 
 73. Id. at 1785. 
 74. See Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676–78 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(upholding the jury’s punitive award on the ground that doing so would be consistent with 
the deterrent purpose of punitive damages). 
 75. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 57, at 137, 208–10, 524–27, 761–66. 
 76. 233 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 77. Id. at 445–46. The host father committed statutory rape, and perhaps other crimes as 
well. However, probably for reasons having to do with the difficulty of proving that proper 
care by the placement agency could have prevented the father’s initial criminal acts, which 
occurred relatively soon after the victim was placed with the family, the plaintiff’s civil 
action did not emphasize the agency’s failure to protect Kristin from Bruce’s attacks, and 
instead focused on its failure to prevent the plaintiff’s trauma at having been coerced into a 
disastrous “relationship” that ended with the host father’s suicide. See Beul v. ASSE Int’l, 
Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 942, 945–46 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (so characterizing plaintiff’s claim), aff’d, 
233 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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We include Beul in our casebook in part because of the methodical way in 
which Judge Posner proceeds through the legal issues raised by the case, which 
range from the applicability of respondeat superior to non-employee volunteers, to 
the ways in which federal regulations should figure in assessing the placement 
agency’s carelessness, to the leeway factfinders enjoy to make findings on 
causation, to the propriety of instructions bearing on the victim’s alleged 
comparative fault.78 On the core issue of liability, moreover, Posner in our view 
gets things right by affirming a judgment that the agency was liable to the student 
for carelessly failing to protect her against the grave emotional trauma she suffered. 
And yet, the opinion in Beul is unsatisfying in one important respect. In trying to 
stave off liability, the placement service argued that the criminally abusive actions 
of Richard Bruce, the host father, should cut off ASSE’s liability notwithstanding 
the careless failure of its volunteer (Breber) to monitor the placement in a way that 
could have prevented the harms inflicted on Kristin. Posner’s opinion rightly 
rejects this argument, but the grounds on which it does so are unpersuasive. Had he 
paid more attention to our work, he could have written a better-reasoned opinion. 
Here is an excerpt from Judge Posner’s analysis of the agency’s attempt to avoid 
liability based on the nature of Richard Bruce’s intervening wrongdoing: 
 As for the argument that Bruce’s misconduct was so egregious as to 
let ASSE off the hook, it is true that the doctrine of “superseding cause” 
can excuse a negligent defendant. Suicide by a sane person, unless 
clearly foreseeable by the tortfeasor, for example a psychiatrist treating 
a depressed person, is a traditional example of the operation of the 
doctrine. So if Bruce’s boss had refused him a raise and Bruce had 
responded by killing himself, the boss even if somehow negligent in 
failing to give him the raise would not be considered the legal cause of 
the death. Or if through the carelessness of the driver a truck spilled a 
toxic substance and a passerby scraped it up and poisoned his mother-
in-law with it, the driver would not be liable to the mother-in-law’s 
estate; the son-in-law’s criminal act would be deemed a superseding 
cause. 
 Animating the doctrine is the idea that it is unreasonable to make a 
person liable for such improbable consequences of negligent activity as 
could hardly figure in his deciding how careful he should be. The 
doctrine is not applied, therefore, when the duty of care claimed to have 
been violated is precisely a duty to protect against ordinarily 
unforeseeable conduct, as in our earlier example of a psychiatrist 
treating depression. The existence of the duty presupposes a probable, 
therefore a foreseeable, consequence of its breach. (All that 
“foreseeable” means in tort law is probable ex ante, that is, before the 
injury that is the basis of the tort suit.) Thus a hospital that fails to 
maintain a careful watch over patients known to be suicidal is not 
excused by the doctrine of superseding cause from liability for a 
suicide, any more than a zoo can escape liability for allowing a tiger to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 78. Beul, 233 F.3d at 444–45. At the same time, we acknowledge that there is also in 
Beul a regrettable passage, quoted below, in which Judge Posner’s pithy writing betrays him. 
Id. at 448 (describing the host father’s mistreatment of the plaintiff as “sexual hanky-
panky”). 
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escape and maul people on the ground that the tiger is the superseding 
cause of the mauling. 
 So Kristin’s high school would not have been liable for the 
consequences of Bruce’s sexual activity with Kristin even if the school 
should have reported her frequent absences to Breber; [Bruce’s] 
criminal activities with their bizarre suicide sequel were not foreseeable 
by the school. But part of ASSE’s duty and Breber’s function was to 
protect foreign girls and boys from sexual hanky-panky initiated by 
members of host families. Especially when a teenage girl is brought to 
live with strangers in a foreign country, the risk of inappropriate sexual 
activity is not so slight that the organization charged by the girl’s 
parents with the safety of their daughter can be excused as a matter of 
law from making a responsible effort to minimize the risk. Sexual 
abuse by stepfathers is not uncommon, and the husband in a host family 
has an analogous relationship to a teenage visitor living with the 
family.79 
It is appropriate to hold the agency responsible, Posner says, because the 
agency—like a hospital dealing with a suicidal patient or a zoo that keeps a 
dangerous animal—had access to information that alerted it to the presence of a 
significant risk of harm that could otherwise be presumed to be quite small and 
therefore ignored. If he meant by this that the agency incurred a duty to Kristin 
because it had actual knowledge of the danger to her posed by Richard Bruce—
which is what he would have needed to say to render the hospital and zoo examples 
analogous80—then his analysis was factually unsupported. The agency had no such 
knowledge.81 If he meant instead that the agency incurred a duty because its 
volunteer had better access to information about the danger to Kristin posed by 
Bruce, then his attempt to distinguish the agency from the school fails. As his 
opinion acknowledges, Kristin missed a lot of school, and Bruce was the one who 
would call the school to report that she was “sick” and would be absent. The school 
was probably as well situated as the agency, if not better situated, to detect the 
danger to Kristin posed by Bruce.82 Finally, if Posner meant to say that the agency 
owed Kristin a duty to take steps to protect her from Bruce because, as a general 
matter, agencies have better access to information than do schools about the risks 
posed to foreign exchange students by host fathers, his analysis rests on a set of 
speculative and not particularly plausible empirical assertions. At a minimum, we 
                                                                                                                 
 
 79. Id. at 447–48 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 80. Even with actual knowledge, there would still be a salient difference given that the 
agency lacked the physical control over Bruce that a hospital has over an incompetent patient 
or a zoo has over an animal. 
 81. In fact, the agency had no reason to know of Bruce’s dangerousness. See Beul, 55 F. 
Supp. 2d at 949–50, (noting that a background check would have revealed nothing to suggest 
that the Bruces were unfit to serve as host parents), aff’d, 233 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 82. Posner misleadingly asserts that “[Bruce’s] criminal activities with their bizarre 
suicide sequel were not foreseeable by the school.” Beul, 233 F.3d at 448. The issue is 
whether the agency or the school was in a position to foresee that Kristin was at risk of 
trauma through host parent mistreatment, not whether those entities could foresee that she 
would be traumatized in the precise way in which she was traumatized. 
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do not see why schools are less capable of appreciating the risk of host-parent 
abuse than exchange agencies. 
The problem Posner faces in this aspect of Beul resides in his determination to 
rid normative concepts such as duty of their normativity: to boil duty down to 
known or knowable probabilities.83 Contra Posner, “foreseeable” in negligence law 
does not reduce down to probabilities. And in any event, in a case like this, the duty 
inquiry turns not just on foreseeability but on a judgment about which sort of actor 
or entity (if any) is appropriately regarded as having a duty to look after a foreign 
student’s emotional well-being. 
There are two particularly important aspects to this inquiry. First, one must 
attend more carefully than does Posner to the nature of the wrongdoing alleged by 
the victim. Kristin’s claim against the agency was for nonfeasance rather than 
misfeasance. The allegation was not that the agency had traumatized Kristin, but 
that it had failed to protect her against trauma at the hands of a third-party 
wrongdoer. Courts, of course, have long maintained (though not without 
controversy) a reluctance to recognize liability for nonfeasance. Yet they have not 
flat out refused to recognize such liability. Instead, they have looked for particular 
grounds supporting recognition of an affirmative duty, especially the presence or 
absence of a certain kind of relationship between defendant and plaintiff.84 
This leads to the second point: ASSE (unlike Kristin’s school) stood out as a 
candidate for bearing an affirmative duty to protect Kristin precisely because of the 
kind of relationship that existed between them. As Posner’s opinion eventually 
recognizes: 
ASSE . . . was standing in the shoes of the parents of a young girl living 
in a stranger’s home far from her homeland and could reasonably be 
expected to exercise the kind of care that the parents themselves would 
exercise if they could to protect their 16–year–old daughter from the 
sexual pitfalls that lie about a girl of that age in those circumstances. 
ASSE assumed a primary role in the protection of the girl.85 
In sum, Beul’s reliance on mere probabilities, an artifact of Posner’s academic 
commitment to replace what he takes to be “legal mumbo-jumbo”86 with 
supposedly more determinate concepts drawn from outside law, weakens his 
opinion. Had Posner attended to our writings on duty in negligence law,87 and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 83. Posner tries to shore up the “scientific” basis for his analysis by citing to a study on 
rates of sexual abuse by stepfathers, arguing that host fathers can be analogized for these 
purposes to stepfathers, and that ASSE as a placement agency that regularly deals with host 
fathers could be charged with knowledge of the risk of abuse posed by host fathers as quasi-
stepfathers. Id. As noted in the text, he does not bother to explain why professional educators 
who deal with children on a regular basis, such as school administrators, would have lesser 
access to the same knowledge. 
 84. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM §§ 37, 40 (2010) (articulating the default no-duty rule and exceptions based on special 
relationships). 
 85. Beul, 233 F.3d at 448. 
 86. Shadday v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 477 F.3d 511, 513 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 87. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 29, at 1807–11, 1825–42 (criticizing duty-
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particularly our writings about the intersection of affirmative duty doctrine and 
superseding cause,88 he could have done better. 
We turn next to Shadday v. Omni Hotels Management Corp.,89 another 
negligence case with upsetting facts involving a sexual assault. The plaintiff was a 
guest at the defendant’s large, upscale Washington, D.C. hotel. She had drinks in 
the hotel bar with a “seemingly very respectable Guatemalan lawyer.”90 When the 
bar closed and the guest was in the lobby awaiting an elevator, the man accosted 
her. She ran into a waiting elevator, but the man followed her into it and there 
raped her.91 The rapist was later arrested and convicted. The guest sued the hotel, 
arguing that it breached a duty to take care to protect her from the attack. 
Posner’s opinion for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment to the hotel. Adopting reasoning similar to that on display in 
Beul, he purported to focus exclusively on ex ante probabilities, opining that guest-
on-guest violence is such a remote possibility that a hotel of this sort is under no 
duty to take steps to prevent that sort of violence.92 He granted that the hotel was 
obligated to take security measures against intruder-on-guest violence but argued 
that the plaintiff was not entitled to point to that duty as a basis for liability. Here 
Posner invoked the “scope of the risk” idea famously illustrated by the old English 
case of Gorris v. Scott93—because this was the “wrong sort” of attack, the hotel 
could not be held liable for it even assuming that it could have been prevented had 
the hotel exercised due care with respect to the risk of the right kind of attack.94 
This limitation on liability, he concluded, is necessary to protect hotels from 
unpredictable liability. Such liability, he further reasoned, should not be allowed 
because it is of no social value: it is likely to have little deterrent effect and will 
sometimes result in erroneous judgments against actors who acted with due care.95 
Once again Posner’s concern to avoid the normative dimensions of duty, and 
also his determination to treat tort law entirely in terms of deterrence, overrides his 
lawyerly judgment. The idea that a hotel owes no duty to its guests to take steps to 
protect them from other guests is quite untenable. Imagine that a hotel installed 
low-grade electronic locks that enabled guests easily to use their own room keys to 
open other guest’s rooms. If a guest were to take advantage of this inadequate 
security system to break into the room of another guest and attack the other, the 
victim’s claim that the hotel failed in a basic responsibility to provide security 
would be quite compelling. This would be a failure to provide the security that a 
                                                                                                                 
skepticism and explaining why special relationships figure prominently in courts’ duty 
analysis). 
 88. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 34, at 1238–44 (discussing the interaction of duty 
and superseding cause doctrine). 
 89. 477 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 90. Id. at 512. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. at 514 (maintaining that, since the major risk of crime against hotel guests is 
from intruders rather than staff or guests, the hotel’s obligation to its guests is that of 
“maintaining a reasonable perimeter defense . . . and also an inner, back-up defense in case 
[an] intruder manages to get inside the hotel”). 
 93. [1874] 9 L.R. Exch. 125. 
 94. Shadday, 477 F.3d at 517–18. 
 95. Id. at 518. 
2013] CIVIL RECOURSE DEFENDED 589 
 
guest reasonably expects from a hotel and that a hotel implicitly promises to its 
guests. The duty Shadday was owed was a duty to take ordinary care against her 
being attacked on the premises. Parsing that risk into the risk of attack by intruders 
versus guests is arbitrary and unmotivated. 
To be sure, the evidence described in the Seventh Circuit’s opinion suggests that 
the plaintiff in Shadday faced an uphill battle on breach and actual causation. Yet 
the evidence does not appear to have been so one-sided as to warrant taking those 
issues away from the jury. And even if a plunge into court records were to reveal 
that summary judgment was appropriate on one or both of those issues, it matters 
for future cases, for primary actors (e.g., hotels), and for insurers that Shadday 
mistakenly asserts that the defendant had no duty to take care to protect its guest 
against another guest’s attack. Here, again, Posner might have learned something 
from our work. 
Like many people who are good at what they do, Posner the judge fails to grasp 
how easily things come to him. This is in part why he sees little value in our work. 
“I knew that already,” seems to be his predominant reaction. Yet in today’s 
intellectual climate—one that Posner has helped to create—it is all too easy for 
courts and commentators to lose sight of basic features of tort law that our work 
tends to emphasize, but that he takes for granted. Illustrative is a case that we 
discussed in our AALS talk: Comer v. Murphy Oil USA.96 
Comer involved a lawsuit brought by victims of Hurricane Katrina against large 
energy companies. The theory of liability was that the defendants’ emission of 
greenhouse gasses had contributed to Katrina’s ferocity and hence the damage it 
caused. The lawsuit asserted claims for trespass, negligence, and public and private 
nuisance, among others. The district court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss 
the plaintiffs’ tort claims on standing and political question grounds, but a Fifth 
Circuit panel reversed.97 Rehearing en banc was subsequently granted,98 as a result 
of which the panel’s reversal of the district court’s dismissal was vacated.99 
However, prior to the actual rehearing, several of the appellate court’s judges 
recused themselves—so many that the court lacked the quorum necessary to rule en 
banc. The appeal was therefore dismissed.100 The effect of this dismissal was to 
leave intact the district court’s initial decision to dismiss the lawsuit entirely.101 
It is arguable that the Comer litigation would today fail on the merits given the 
Supreme Court’s decision in American Electric Power, although as the latter 
attests, standing and political question doctrines are complex.102 What is truly 
remarkable is that the litigation in Comer got as far as it did. The plaintiffs’ 
negligence claims quite clearly failed on causation, and the trespass and private 
nuisance claims were even weaker, as a doctrinal matter. Simply put, the plaintiffs 
offered no evidence to suggest that the conduct of the defendants was an actual or 
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131 S. Ct. 902 (2011). 
 97. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009). 
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proximate cause of the injuries of which they were complaining. Remarkably, the 
Comer plaintiffs re-filed their claim in the same district court after their petition for 
a writ of mandamus from the United States Supreme Court was denied.103 In an 
opinion published in March 2012, a district court judge finally stated the obvious: 
The assertion that the defendants’ emissions combined over a period of 
decades or centuries with other natural and man-made gases to cause or 
strengthen a hurricane and damage personal property is precisely the 
type of remote, improbable, and extraordinary occurrence that is 
excluded from liability. Therefore, the Court finds that the plaintiffs 
have not asserted a plausible claim for relief under state law.104 
What is going on? The answer in the first instance is that the plaintiffs and their 
lawyers saw in tort law an opportunity to achieve regulatory goals that had not been 
achieved, and were unlikely to be achieved, through legislation or regulation. In 
other words, this was but another instance—albeit a dramatic one—of the “private 
attorney general” model of tort litigation in action. Our principal problem, though, 
is not with the motivation of the plaintiffs, but with the lack of seriousness about 
the content of tort law displayed by the Fifth Circuit. Judges are not supposed to 
treat tort law as some sort of game whereby liability can attach so long as one can 
tack together an allegation of antisocial conduct (even antisocial conduct with 
potentially severe consequences) with an allegation of a setback (even a serious 
setback). A tort plaintiff must be prepared to put forward evidence that the 
defendant wrongfully injured her, not merely that the defendant acted wrongfully in 
some general sense and that the plaintiff suffered an injury that has no particular 
connection to that conduct. 
Again, we do not suggest that tort law is incapable of accomplishing public 
goals (such as improved safety). Nor do we suggest that tort law should be 
understood as a rigid pleading system with no room for the recognition of new 
wrongs and new injuries. Our point is more modest, but still important. A tort 
claimant must establish that she has suffered an injury that can plausibly be 
enveloped within the notion of a relational wrong. In this instance—unlike many 
others in which defendants are merely crying wolf—the defendants were right to 
maintain that the plaintiffs were attempting to use tort law as a means of 
sidestepping the political institutions through which climate change, understood as 
a political and social problem, must be addressed. This same defense argument 
would be entirely hollow if made against claimants who could plausibly claim that 
a political problem was also, as to them, a relational wrong. Nuisance plaintiffs in a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 103. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849, 854 (S.D. Miss. 2012) (citing 
In re Comer, 131 S. Ct. 902 (2011)). 
 104. Id. at 868. The district court also dismissed the case on collateral estoppel, 
justiciability, and other grounds, in part relying upon the Supreme Court’s American Electric 
Power decision. Id. at 857, 865 (citing Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 
(2011)). 
2013] CIVIL RECOURSE DEFENDED 591 
 
case like Boomer105 are entitled to redress even if an environmentalist agenda is 
part of what motivates their suit. But they are not granted redress because doing so 
will help combat the systemic problem of air pollution. Instead it is because, in 
these instances, the defendant’s polluting activities also constitute an unreasonable 
interference with their use and enjoyment of their property. Comer is an indication 
that courts are losing their ability to distinguish conduct that is antisocial from 
conduct that is not only antisocial but also tortious. Our work is in part an effort to 
reverse this trend. 
It is not particularly surprising that the Fifth Circuit in Comer ultimately handed 
the defendants a victory. What is stunning is that two out of three members of the 
panel seem not to have recognized that this outcome was dictated by basic rules of 
Mississippi tort law.106 As a result, the plaintiffs were denied relief only because of 
a bizarre procedural sequence that no doubt left them dissatisfied, perhaps 
justifiably so, with the process they received. Comer is an instance of policy-
sensitive quivering by judges at the precipice of a very easy tort case. Neither 
Holmes nor Cardozo would have handled the case in the way it was handled by the 
appellate judges, and our guess is that Posner would not have either. But not every 
judge is Holmes, Cardozo, or Posner. While by no means an effort to squeeze tort 
law into a rigid, formal box, or to deny its potential salutary effects for the public, 
civil recourse theory aims to restore in students, in lawyers, and in judges the 
healthy and accurate sense that there is a body of tort law to be deployed and that it 
is not to be ignored or bent out of shape merely because some good might come 
from imposing or denying liability. 
B. Calabresi 
Judge Calabresi faults us for being “reductionist” in assigning to tort a single 
function or purpose.107 He also criticizes us, as does Posner, for having nothing to 
say about what renders conduct wrongful within tort law.108 Calabresi is 
demonstrably incorrect in attributing “reductionism” to our work and, again like 
Posner, seemingly indifferent to our published writings on the nature of tortious 
                                                                                                                 
 
 105. Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970) (recognizing a private 
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wrongs. However, in contrast to Posner, Calabresi offers his criticisms with 
characteristic good humor. In doing so, he allows us a somewhat better grasp of 
why our work seems to drive these two great judges and scholars crazy and why 
they have so misunderstood our theoretical and practical aspirations. 
Calabresi claims that we fail to recognize that tort law, and particular doctrines 
within it, serve many different purposes. Yet he knows that this is not the case. In a 
symposium honoring his classic work, The Costs of Accidents, we (in his presence) 
criticized that book precisely on the ground that its exclusive focus on tort as a 
potential mechanism for the reduction of accident costs (subject to justice-based 
side constraints) adopted far too narrow an account of the many goods that might 
come from having tort law.109 These include: (1) tort law’s articulation and 
clarification of norms of responsibility that attend different forms of human 
interaction; (2) its empowerment of individuals vis-à-vis each other and the state; 
(3) its recognition and reaffirmation that individuals are entitled to equal concern 
and respect; (4) its contribution to the maintenance of civil order and civil society; 
(5) its functioning as a “bottom-up” and relatively nonbureaucratic form of 
governance; and (6) its context sensitivity and hence its potential to achieve a kind 
of equity in resolving particular disputes. (At the same time, we have 
acknowledged that the law in action will often fail to achieve these goods, and that 
the achievement of these goods can also generate significant costs.)110 
This was hardly the only occasion on which we have explicitly recognized the 
plurality of goods associated with tort law.111 So how is it that Calabresi can find 
his way to accusing us of reductionism? The answer may lie in his being captive to 
a false assumption about tort theory. According to that assumption, the only cogent 
definitions of tort law are those that define it exclusively in terms of some 
purpose(s) that it serves. For example, on one familiar functional definition, tort 
law is just courts deciding when to harness the threat of liability to incentivize 
actors to take precautions against harming others. Calabresi, it seems, misconstrues 
us to be offering a monolithic functionalist account of tort as law that exists for the 
exclusive purpose of providing civil recourse to victims of wrongs. 
We approach tort theory differently. We maintain that, in order to see what 
goods tort law stands to achieve (as well as its limitations), one must first have a 
sense of what tort law is, apart from the functions it might serve. Our further claim 
is that the principle of civil recourse has a special place in the explanation of what 
tort law is. Tort law’s being a law of civil recourse is, on our view, exactly what 
enables it to achieve goods such as those identified above. In a tort case, the 
question is whether the defendant acted upon the plaintiff in a manner that a 
legislature or courts have identified as a relational, injurious wrong, or that can be 
regarded as such under a good-faith application of the principles implicit in the 
wrongs that have already been recognized. This is so because tort plaintiffs (like 
certain other kinds of civil plaintiffs) really are asserting a right to make a judicially 
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enforceable demand of another person, and our system regards each of us as 
entitled to be free of such demands unless we have committed certain kinds of 
wrongs against the person making the demand. We have carefully made the case 
that, overwhelmingly, courts do frame the question of whether a plaintiff has a right 
of action in roughly these terms. And they do so because the principle of civil 
recourse—the principle that those who have been injured by conduct that is 
wrongful and injurious as to them are entitled to recourse against the wrongdoer—
is entrenched in our legal system. For us, the functional question is the question of 
what goods can come from having this sort of law: that is, law that instantiates the 
principle of civil recourse. To this question we have unequivocally answered: 
“many things!” 
Of course any account of tort law maintaining that it is a law of recourse for 
wrongs must address the question of why the law counts only certain ways of 
interacting with other persons as wrongs. Calabresi claims that we have failed to 
say anything on this question: that we have not given an account of what Holmes 
called the “life of the law”—the considerations that drive judges to decide tort 
cases the way that they do. Here he echoes Judge Posner in emphasizing that we 
have supposedly said nothing about when and why courts recognize limitations on 
tort liability (such as no-duty and proximate cause rules in negligence law) and why 
courts have decided in some cases to impose liability on manufacturers whose 
products injure consumers, whereas in other cases they do not.112 
We confess to being flabbergasted by these complaints. We have written ad 
nauseam on duty in negligence, parsing the different senses in which courts invoke 
it, and identifying different types of reasons for limiting liability that attend those 
different senses.113 We have also had more than a little to say in our published 
writings about topics such as proximate cause and products liability. Even beyond 
this, we presented in our remarks at the AALS meeting an analysis of the New 
York Court of Appeals’ no-duty decision in the Lauer case,114 as Calabresi 
acknowledges.115 
In August of 1993, Andrew Lauer, the three-year-old son of plaintiff Edward 
Lauer and his wife Lisa, fell ill.116 The Lauers took Andrew to a hospital, but tests 
did not reveal any underlying medical condition, so Andrew was sent home with 
his parents. That night, Andrew died. After the Lauers discovered their son dead, 
Dr. Eddy Lilavois, a medical examiner in New York City’s medical examiner’s 
office, conducted an autopsy. Finding massive hemorrhaging at the base of 
Andrew’s brain, Dr. Lilavois ruled the death a homicide by blunt trauma. Mr. Lauer 
immediately became the prime suspect and was that day subjected to a twelve-hour 
police interrogation. Afterwards police continued aggressively to investigate him. 
Because of these developments, Mrs. Lauer came to believe that Mr. Lauer had 
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killed their son and divorced him. Edward Lauer’s friends and neighbors likewise 
turned on him to the point that he was required to sell his home and move to 
another neighborhood. Charges were never brought because of a lack of evidence 
corroborating Dr. Lilavois’s initial finding. 
In March of 1995, seventeen months after the child’s death, a local newspaper 
undertook to write an article on the stalled criminal investigation. The newspaper 
then learned that staff in the medical examiner’s office, including Dr. Lilavois and 
a neuropathologist, had performed a follow-up autopsy three weeks after the boy’s 
death through which they determined that the original autopsy was mistaken: the 
boy had died of natural causes. Yet neither Dr. Lilavois nor anyone else in the 
medical examiner’s office altered the death certificate, issued a correction of their 
original findings, or revealed the error to the police or to the parents. The error 
came to light only because of the newspaper’s investigation. Mr. Lauer was 
exonerated, but his life by then had been destroyed. 
Lauer sued Dr. Lilavois and the medical examiner’s office, pleading negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, among other torts.117 Although New York’s lower 
courts were willing to entertain the claim, the New York Court of Appeals in a 5-2 
decision held that it failed as a matter of law because the defendants owed no duty 
to take care in relation to the risk of the plaintiff’s life falling apart.118 Treating the 
duty element as an invitation to look for systemic reasons why negligence liability 
ought to be blocked, the majority cast itself as the adult in the room: the one strong 
enough to make a hard decision for the greater good. “‘It is always tempting, 
especially when symmetry and sympathy would so seem to be best served, to 
impose new duties, and, concomitantly, liabilities, regardless of the economic and 
social burden.’”119 Resisting the pull of “symmetry and sympathy,” the court 
reasoned that “allowing emotional distress claims against a municipality for an 
official’s negligent failure to transmit correct information to law enforcement 
authorities conducting criminal investigations in this case will have far-reaching 
effects in future cases.”120 
When we read this opinion—authored by a moderate, open-minded and 
compassionate judge—we are convinced that something has gone very wrong in 
standard ways of thinking about tort law. The problem is not just that Lauer’s 
floodgates argument is hopelessly vague as to the “far-reaching effects” that 
supposedly required its ruling. It is equally the court’s deafness to the plaintiff’s 
argument that the defendants owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. The medical 
examiner’s office had conducted an autopsy and prepared and delivered a report 
that placed a particular person’s well-being in peril. The office knew that its actions 
would have this effect: it was a willing and knowing participant in the process of 
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criminal justice. The office then discovered that the entire premise of the peril it 
created for that person was based on its own prior mistake. At that point, the 
relevant office personnel surely owed a moral duty to the person whom it knew to 
have been wrongly imperiled by its mistake to correct the mistake. And while 
moral duties do not always translate into legal duties, this moral duty—given the 
context in which it arose—surely is one that had a powerful claim to recognition in 
law. 
What, then, does civil recourse theory contribute to the analysis of a decision 
like Lauer? To understand tort law as a law of wrongs and recourse is to understand 
that tort liability hinges on the breach of a relational duty. In negligence, the duty 
question is whether there is a duty owed to another (or others) to be vigilant of an 
aspect of his well-being, and to take ordinary care not to interfere with that aspect 
of his well-being. Contra the New York Court of Appeals, the question of duty, in 
the first instance, is not the question of floodgates or aggregate consequences. As 
dissenting Judge Smith explained, quoting from New York Court of Appeals 
precedent and the canonical English case of Heaven v. Pender, duty in negligence, 
as in morality, turns primarily on how an actor is positioned relative to another121: 
whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with 
regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who did think would 
at once recognize that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his 
own conduct with regard to the circumstances he would cause danger 
of injury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use 
ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger.122 
The fact that Dr. Lilavois was responsible in the first instance for creating the 
risk that the plaintiff’s life would be ruined, that he (and others in his office) had 
the power to eliminate that risk, and that he (and others in his office) actually knew 
these things and could easily have fixed his mistake, all strongly support the 
conclusion that Dr. Lilavois, among others, really was obligated to Lauer to correct 
the mistake and thereby spare Lauer from the ruination he was experiencing. A 
cruel irony of Lauer is that here, as in many other cases, legal “realism” causes the 
law completely to lose touch with reality. Civil recourse theory aims to reground 
our thinking about tort law; to remind lawyers that torts really are breaches of 
duties owed to others not to injure them. 
We repeat here our conference remarks about Lauer to help to convey the depth 
of our puzzlement over Calabresi’s assertion that we have nothing to say on the 
scope of tortious wrongdoing, and particularly on no-duty doctrines in negligence. 
What can he mean by this? As we have quite obviously addressed these topics, 
including in remarks made in his presence, we suppose he must instead be accusing 
us of having nothing useful to say. This conclusion, however, follows only because 
he adopts parochial criteria for what counts as saying something “useful.” 
The tip-off is in Calabresi’s own account of Lauer, which he describes as a 
“great decision.” It is a great decision, he says, because it recognized that: 
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the question of duty is a question that . . . must be decided based on a 
series of factors that have little to do with a particular person’s right to 
civil recourse. The factors the court speaks of are deterrence, spreading, 
and economic effects. I have my students read Lauer and then kind of 
laugh when they say: “It looks like Calabresi’s Costs of Accidents; it 
looks like the things that you wrote should be looked at.” In other 
words, the court in Lauer seemingly held that the question of duty must 
be decided based on factors that have little—perhaps too little —to do 
with civil recourse.123 
We would not be so keen to claim credit for this particular decision, and indeed are 
surprised to see it endorsed by a jurist who has shown a deftness in deciding tort 
cases that is missing from Lauer.124 In any event, the passage reveals basic 
mistakes about civil recourse theory and about judicial reasoning in tort cases. In 
particular, it rests on the false supposition that reasons of “deterrence, spreading 
and economic effects” are the sorts of reasons one must look for if one is going to 
provide a meaningful account of why courts define tortious wrongs the way that 
they do. To be sure, these are sometimes relevant reasons, and courts sometimes 
properly invoke them in determining, for example, when a legal duty is owed, as 
we have acknowledged.125 But they are not the only relevant reasons and in many 
contexts they are not, and should not be, particularly important. 
To state the obvious, courts typically find reasons for their decisions in rules and 
principles already contained in the precedents that courts are prima facie bound to 
follow. Likewise, the recognition of duties in everyday morality routinely serves as 
grounds for the recognition of parallel legal duties (though, again, tort duties do not 
simply track moral duties). It is understandable why the individual defendants in 
Lauer were reluctant to correct their mistake. Nobody likes to admit to a serious 
error, particularly if doing so will likely entail adverse employment actions. Still, as 
a matter of ordinary morality, it is ludicrous to suppose that Dr. Lilavois, at least, 
was entitled to allow a man’s life to be destroyed merely to avoid the consequences 
that awaited him upon disclosure of his mistake. These sorts of considerations 
support the recognition of a tort duty, owed to Lauer by Dr. Lilavois and perhaps 
others in the examiner’s office, to correct the mistake and liability for injury caused 
by failing in that duty. This sort of reasoning about duty, and about the wrong of 
negligence, is cogent, not vacuous. Much of what we have written about duty, 
negligence, and civil recourse theory aims to validate it as against the longstanding 
but impoverished view, here reiterated by Calabresi, that “real” reasoning in law 
must involve reasoning about aggregate social consequences. 
Again, we are not advocating that open questions of duty in negligence are to be 
resolved by judicial reliance on raw, unstructured, we-know-it-when-we-see-it 
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moral intuitions. They should not be, and they need not be, because negligence law, 
like tort law more generally, has moral concepts already built into it, and structures 
them in ways that help to guide their further deployment. There is nothing 
particularly subjective or esoteric about legal reasoning of this sort. It has long been 
the stock-in-trade of common law courts and was very much on display in the 
dissenting opinions in Lauer. As they emphasized, it was not simply the 
foreseeability of harm to Lauer from nondisclosure that generated a duty to disclose 
the error. It was also the fact that Dr. Lilavois’s own erroneous report was a source 
of the peril, and that he was under an affirmative duty to correct his error as a 
matter of his statutorily defined job responsibilities. It was not simply his failure to 
report, but the fact that the police and the district attorney’s office were expected to 
rely and did rely on his report. It is not simply Dr. Lilavois’s self-serving behavior, 
but his flouting of standards of behavior beyond what New York Court of Appeals’ 
precedents had already designated as an outer boundary of immunity for public 
officials. Finally, the litany of harmful consequences suffered by the plaintiff—his 
divorce, his being made into a pariah, his trauma’s attendant physical 
manifestations—not only went toward establishing the seriousness of the injury as 
a moral matter, but to its cognizability as emotional harm under New York law. 
Each of the words and phrases italicized in the preceding paragraph references 
moral considerations that are contained in legal concepts that had been previously 
deployed by New York courts faced with duty issues. As such, they could have 
readily been invoked in Lauer to fashion a rule that simultaneously acknowledged 
the power of the plaintiff’s claim and set appropriate limits on public officials’ 
responsibilities and liabilities. For example, the court could have ruled that an 
official owes others a duty to take steps to prevent injury to them whenever the 
official (or someone with whom the official has a relationship of responsibility) has 
committed a ministerial mistake, of which the official is actually aware, and the 
circumstances are such that a reasonable person would recognize that failure to 
correct the mistake would pose to an identifiable person or persons an immediate 
and substantial risk of injury. Other limited duty rules might similarly have been 
fashioned out of the available legal materials. The point is not to nail down the best 
rule. Rather, we aim to demonstrate that our complaint about Lauer is not that the 
judges in the majority failed to consult their consciences. It is that they could have 
done a better job of legal reasoning. 
At the end of the day, Calabresi, like Posner, seems to doubt the possibility that 
a certain kind of putative explanation can genuinely explain anything. Both are 
skeptical that one can really illuminate the wrongs of tort law by reflecting on 
social norms concerning how persons are required to avoid mistreating others, or 
concerning entitlements not to be so mistreated, or concerning the extent to which 
individuals enjoy a liberty to conduct themselves in a manner not constrained by 
any such duties. Such skepticism would be understandable in the face of a 
foundationalist effort to identify at a theoretical level the true account of 
individuals’ rights and duties, and then to impose that account onto the law. 
However, that is not what we are up to. Rather, we are trying to interpret legal 
notions of right and duty in light of concepts found in ordinary morality that legal 
concepts rather obviously track. In this context, we think it likelier that it is 
Calbresi and Posner who are the dogmatists, not us. 
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That we find ourselves fighting with our opponents on this particular terrain is 
more than a little frustrating. For decades, scholars have clung to a uniquely 
American form of pragmatic instrumentalism, typically rooted in a mélange of 
legal realism, utilitarianism, and emotivism. Yet in the second half of the twentieth 
century, a diverse collection of scholars, including Hart, Rawls, Dworkin, and Raz, 
offered powerful arguments against the notion that utilitarianism, moral skepticism, 
and legal realism are the only positions available to “sophisticated” or “hard-
headed” theorists or to those who reject strong versions of natural law or 
formalism.126 If anything, they argued, sophistication and clear philosophical 
thinking would lead to openness about the general viability of many forms of legal 
and moral discourse. 
Later, in the 1980s and 90s, Jules Coleman and Ernest Weinrib developed some 
of these insights into powerful and sophisticated attacks against reflexive and 
reductive instrumentalism in tort law.127 However, Coleman has quite openly 
recognized his own account as schematic and deliberately adopted a kind of 
agnosticism as to what might count as a wrong.128 Similarly, Weinrib has self-
consciously characterized his view as anti-pragmatic and as dependent on 
acceptance of a general framework of Kantian right.129 These particular features of 
their arguments have left them vulnerable to at least some of the criticisms that 
Calabresi and Posner now inappropriately raise against us. 
For the past fifteen years, our project has been double-barreled. On the one 
hand, while readily acknowledging that our work builds on that of Coleman and 
Weinrib, we have criticized their work and have developed civil recourse theory as 
an alternative in part because we think it avoids important criticisms that can fairly 
be leveled against their work.130 On the other hand, we have maintained that 
anyone who hopes to offer a compelling account of tort law must get his or her 
hands dirty by immersion in the law. This is why we have devoted so much time 
and effort to making sense of canonical tort decisions and modern classics,131 and 
why we have written about doctrines ranging from duty in negligence to punitive 
damages.132 This is why we have extensively engaged the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts.133 This is why we have published a primer and a casebook that, we hope, 
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fairly and accessibly present the subject while doing so in a way that demonstrates 
the power of the wrongs-and-recourse framework to make sense of tort law.134 
In sum, we have approached tort law as both lawyers and legal theorists, and we 
have offered an account of torts that, though theoretical, is grounded in case law 
and appreciative of the complexity and diversity of tort doctrine, as well as the 
different values instantiated in, and served by, tort law. Moreover, we have 
patiently engaged and defused certain broad objections to our project—objections 
that for the most part are grounded in outmoded and underdeveloped ways of 
thinking about law. That Calabresi and Posner feel entitled to issue wholesale 
dismissals of our work, rather than seriously engaging it, ultimately attests to the 
fact that even the most accomplished scholars can sometimes be imprisoned by 
their intellectual prejudices. 
III. CHAMALLAS AND RUSTAD 
Professor Chamallas argues that our way of doing torts scholarship has false 
pretensions to neutrality, is inherently masculine and atomistic, and fails to address 
adequately the ways in which tort law reflects and contributes to domination and 
discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and socioeconomic status.135 Professor 
Rustad, meanwhile, assigns to civil recourse theory a colorful litany of sins, 
including that it “does not permit empirical studies of the law in action,”136 “lacks 
the ‘smell of the streets,’”137 is “ethereal,”138 aims merely to “retell long-standing 
tort stories . . . rather than addressing modern problems,”139 prides itself, like “pure 
mathematics,” on being useless,140 is “barnacle-ridden,”141 treats tort law as a 
“stagnant pond” rather than a “moving stream,”142 has no account of “where the 
doctrine came from and where it is likely to go,”143 and has nothing to say about the 
implications for tort law of new technological and sociological developments.144 
A. Rustad 
It was Rustad’s idea to call for an “audit” of civil recourse theory. We were only 
too happy to open our books for careful review. His own audit, unfortunately, is 
anything but careful. We will offer only a brief response to his scattershot critique.  
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It is true that civil recourse theory is not sociology or empirical social science. 
This is hardly a defect, unless one has an argument as to why interpretive analysis 
is unsound and why sound legal analysis must take the form of sociological or 
empirical analysis. Rustad offers no such argument, and we are not aware of 
anyone else who has made a cogent argument to this effect. His further claim that 
civil recourse theory does not permit empirical analysis is facially bizarre. Our 
writing carries no such injunctive force. Indeed, it can both aid empirical analysis 
(by helping to frame cogent hypotheses) and benefit from it. 
Whatever it takes to render a theory of tort law “ethereal,” or “pure,” these terms 
have no bearing on our work. There is a tired—indeed utterly exhausted—trope in 
legal, academic discourse that contrasts “formalist” with “pragmatic” analysis. This 
is a false dichotomy; legal analysis can and should be both conceptual and 
pragmatic.145 The point is so obvious that, but for U.S. law professors’ seemingly 
infinite appetite for superficial skepticism, it probably would not be worth making. 
Alas, Rustad’s accusations remind us that we must continue to hammer away on 
this issue. Getting straight on the content of tort concepts, and how they relate to 
one another, is necessary for lawyers to make sound legal arguments in tort cases, 
for judges to apply tort law properly, and for legislatures to undertake sensible tort 
reforms. 
Most peculiar is Rustad’s claim that civil recourse theory is innately backward-
looking, and therefore unable to say anything about topics of contemporary interest 
such as multiple causation, lost chance, and the like.146 It is true that a good deal of 
our writing has devoted attention to the history of tort and to tort chestnuts, largely 
in an effort to undo longstanding academic misconceptions that have led modern 
tort scholarship astray. (Shame on us!) But we have hardly done so to the exclusion 
of attention to current developments. Here, Rustad the realist has managed to 
untether himself completely from the reality of our work: the fact that we have 
written on many of these topics does not dissuade him from criticizing us for 
failing to address them.147 
B. Chamallas 
Chamallas’s criticisms are much more sympathetically rendered than Rustad’s 
feverish indictment, and for that we are grateful. Still, there are times when she too 
seems keen to tar us with stock charges that do not fit our work. Thus, she offers 
that civil recourse theory is “built around a model of an abstract, disembodied 
individual who acts and responds apart from social context.”148 Later, we read that 
the “central character” of civil recourse theory is the “masculine subject of liberal 
theory, now depicted as ‘empowered’ rather than simply ‘autonomous.’”149 
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The quoted language demonstrates that Chamallas is at times determined to 
cram our work into a framework that divides political and legal theorists into 
“liberals,” on the one hand, and “communitarians,” “progressives,” and/or 
“feminists,” on the other. Liberals, on this depiction, start from the premise that the 
social world is made up of autonomous actors, each rationally pursuing his self-
interest, unfettered by any ties other than those he voluntarily makes.150 The coin of 
this realm is acquisition and individual achievement. Other putative values, 
particularly of community and relationships are ignored or rejected. Worse, liberals 
are said to present this picture as if it were a neutral description of the world as it 
“really” is, rather than a contestable political construct, and indeed one that has 
many highly undesirable features. 
Chamallas is hardly alone among academics in relying on this framework, 
which is a shame because it is a caricature.151 In any event, there is nothing in our 
writings in tort that commits us to any of the core tenets of “liberalism” so depicted 
and indeed plenty demonstrating that we reject them. In particular, we have argued 
in a decidedly non-atomistic vein that: (1) tort law’s conferral on individual victims 
of a legal power to obtain the state’s assistance in redressing wrongs is partly 
constitutive of the individual as a rights-bearer; (2) when courts entertain tort cases 
they are not merely serving as a locus in which private actors hash out their private 
disputes but instead fulfill an affirmative governmental duty to provide citizens 
with law for the redress of wrongs; and that (3) torts recognize genuine, non-
contractual duties that people owe one another and that track (but also refine and at 
times push against) thick social norms of conduct, many of which are grounded in 
particular relationships.152 None of this is the stuff of “classical legal thought,” 
“classical liberalism,” or “masculine jurisprudence,” or, if it is, then those terms are 
approaching vacuousness. 
Chamallas reports that her “main concern” with civil recourse theory is that it 
offers “too rosy” a picture of tort law because “[i]t does not speak to or say much 
about the disempowerment out there in the real world of injured persons who find 
themselves unable to recover for many of the most serious recurring injuries in 
their lives.”153 In particular, the allegation is that we have nothing to say about 
sexual and racial harassment and exploitation, reproductive injuries, domestic 
violence, or harm to relationships. Chamallas goes still further in suggesting that 
civil recourse theory lends itself to a defense of the unjust status quo by presenting 
tort law as “even-handed, as neutrally selecting which harms to recognize as legal 
wrongs based on consensus norms.”154 
In assessing the force of these criticisms, it will help to keep in mind the context 
in which we have written about tort. Our writings have primarily aimed to 
challenge one of two dominant views held by U.S. torts scholars: namely, that tort 
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law is a mess (either glorious or hopeless) or that it is not a mess only because one 
can impose order on it by replacing its concepts with concepts taken from another 
realm, such as economics. At bottom, our claim is that tort law, though complex, is 
not a mess—that many features of tort law that have been identified as incoherent 
or unintelligible are neither—and that one does not need to impose an external 
conceptual framework in order to grasp its coherence. 
As we noted earlier, this kind of project is distinct from relentlessly prescriptive 
theorizing that attempts to construct an ideal liability regime for the achievement of 
certain goals, and also fundamentally differs from reductionistic efforts to make 
sense of tort by reference to non-tort concepts.155 At the same time, we have been 
reluctant to describe our work as “descriptive” theory, in part because that word is 
often understood to carry with it implicit claims to neutrality (in the sense of being 
uncontestable or value-free). Rather, we have seized on the adjective “interpretive” 
to describe our theory in part because, as both a philosophical matter and a 
pragmatic matter, we reject stark versions of the dichotomy sometimes drawn 
between description and prescription. Tort law admits of competing interpretations. 
We claim that ours is a better interpretation. But we do so on the understanding that 
the evaluation of competing interpretations requires judgments that cannot be 
resolved by appeal to brute data. 
Nor have we claimed “neutrality” for our theory. In fact, we have described it as 
“weakly normative.”156 In doing so, we have explicitly claimed for our theory a 
dimension that Chamallas criticizes us for allegedly suppressing. To make sense of 
a body of law that many have assumed to be incoherent is already to recognize a 
reason for supposing that it is a body of law worth having. Likewise, to see how 
that body of law fits with other parts of our law and with some of the most basic 
principles built into our law and polity—such as principle of equal concern and 
respect—is to identify additional reasons supporting the retention of that body of 
law. 
Still, there is nothing in our approach that amounts to quietism, much less a 
blanket endorsement of the status quo. It is true that our understanding of tort law, 
and law more generally, points toward a more constrained view of judicial 
authority than the sort of maximally unconstrained conception of adjudication that 
sometimes goes under the unhelpful heading of “activist” judicial decision making. 
But we are fans of Cardozo, who quite appropriately rendered important decisions 
that moved tort law forward. Judges, on our view, have ample authority to reform 
tort law in a progressive direction. And legislatures, on our view, enjoy still broader 
leeway to recognize new torts or to make up for the limits of, or deficiencies in, tort 
law by deploying or creating new forms of law. When we claim that Title VII has 
rendered certain forms of workplace discrimination tortious, we do not do so (as 
Chamallas implies157) in aid of a cramped reading of that statute as necessarily 
limited by common law tort principles nor to endorse that statute’s particular 
limitations on liability. Instead, we invoke it to emphasize that there are, as there 
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often should be, genuine statutory torts that both build on common law torts yet 
expand the reach of tort law.158 
Chamallas complains that our approach “treats gender, race, and class bias 
largely as if they were things of the past, equating formal equality with gender and 
race equity.”159 The basis for this complaint is apparently that we have in our 
writing observed that prior historical iterations of tort law contained overtly sexist 
and racist elements, the most blatant of which have been removed from modern 
doctrine. Because we have done so, but then not decried loudly enough remaining 
problematic features of tort law, we are deemed to embrace those features. Would 
we have done better never to mention and criticize past injustices? Is it Chamallas’s 
view that if one discusses some forms of injustice and not others, one must be 
understood as endorsing or tolerating the latter? 
Many of Chamallas’s other criticisms proceed in this same manner. For 
example, she finds fault with our work for “provid[ing] no critique of tort law’s 
dismal record on domestic violence.”160 That we have not discussed this particular 
failing of tort law does not amount to an endorsement or acceptance of it: that is, 
unless scholars who write on tort law can only avoid being deemed to embrace its 
failings by routinely mentioning them. If we had somewhere offered an evaluation 
of the tort system and given it, say, an A– grade for its overall performance in 
terms of recognizing wrongs and actually providing recourse, one could fairly 
criticize us for having offered too rosy a picture of tort law. But we have never said 
any such thing. We have depicted, at a general level, what tort law aims to do, and 
we have acknowledged that it may well fall short, sometimes far short, of that ideal, 
and that when it does there are grounds for law reform. In this respect, civil 
recourse theory does not inhibit criticism of tort law for failing to provide recourse 
for wrongs. Quite the opposite, it provides a basis for such criticism. 
Finally, let us briefly address the allegation that our work devalues injuries such 
as emotional distress, a longstanding concern of Chamallas’s.161 We are befuddled 
by this criticism. To begin with, we have applied civil recourse theory to defend the 
propriety of emotional distress claims or claims for enhanced damages in light of 
substantial emotional distress.162 And, as noted above, in our remarks at the AALS 
conference, we specifically chose as one of three examples for discussion the New 
York Court of Appeals’ decision in the Lauer case.163 We did so because we think 
civil recourse theory offers powerful grounds for criticizing that decision, which 
denied a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The denigration of an 
emotional distress claim by the court, we argued, was symptomatic of a failure of 
the court to take seriously the plaintiff’s claim that a wrong had been done to him—
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that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to take simple steps to prevent the 
plaintiff from having to suffer a very serious ordeal. It would have been helpful to 
hear from Chamallas how this aspect of our presentation jibes with our alleged 
denigration of emotional distress injuries. 
Moreover, we have provided an extended argument as to why, even if emotional 
distress in many contexts is a very significant form of injury warranting the 
recognition of causes of action in tort, courts might nonetheless be justified in 
thinking about emotional distress claims in a different manner than certain kinds of 
claims based on physical harms.164 It may be that there are problems with our 
argument, and indeed we continue to wrestle with the topic of negligent infliction 
of emotional distress, as do many torts scholars of all political and methodological 
persuasions. The point for now is that Chamallas is content to issue her indictment 
without engaging our arguments. This is another example of criticism by 
generalization. Our work is tarred with a position that we have explicitly 
disavowed, and treated as problematic, just by virtue of being tagged as “liberal,” 
“masculine,” or “formalist.” 
The notion of relational duties and the clear rejection of Holmesian atomism is 
as fundamental to the work we have done as any—arguably more fundamental than 
the notion of civil recourse itself. And we stand second to none in our commitment 
to the proposition that wrongs involving dignitary and emotional injury are no less 
central to tort than other kinds of wrongs. (This is in part the point of our use of the 
metaphor of the “gallery of wrongs” to describe tort law.165) Furthermore, to 
recognize that tort law is a law of civil recourse is to recognize that it gives 
expression—albeit highly imperfect expression—to a notion of equality: the idea 
that each of us has rights not to be mistreated by others and standing to call them to 
account when those rights are violated. 
Why, then, all of the criticism? Chamallas is a self-identified critical legal 
scholar. Tort law, for her, is a lens through which to focus on the regressive aspects 
of our society and a canvas on which to paint a vision of a more just world. For her, 
the crusade to do justice is the whole thing; so much so that it should guide the 
enterprise of saying what the law is and how it is best interpreted. Chamallas is not 
merely suspicious of the neutrality of any self-styled “interpretive” enterprise, she 
takes such suspicions to warrant a crusader’s approach at every level of legal 
analysis. By contrast, we maintain that bodies of law are amenable to 
interpretations that do not collapse completely into evaluations. We also maintain 
that a serious effort to understand law need not be tied to complacency or 
regressiveness and can indeed provide motivation and guidance for reforms, both 
incremental and radical. 
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IV. ROBINETTE 
Professor Robinette’s scholarly critique of our work raises three interrelated 
criticisms.166 First, he, too, criticizes us for offering a non-pluralistic view that 
identifies the provision of civil recourse as the purpose of tort law and for failing to 
acknowledge that tort law has many purposes, including compensation and 
deterrence.167 Second, he contends that our descriptive assertion that tort law is a 
law of recourse for wrongs is false because many if not most tort cases are handled 
through routinized processes.168 Third, he faults us for failing to offer a theoretical 
framework within which legal thinkers can address “[t]he most critical normative 
question,” which he takes to be the question of when to treat tort claims “as wrongs 
and when to treat them as routinized, compensable events.”169 
We appreciate not only Robinette’s level of care in trying to capture our work, 
but also his clear and concise synthesis of scholarly work (including his own) on 
the ways in which tort claims are, and have been, processed in a routinized manner 
that often less resembles adjudication as traditionally conceived and instead takes 
the form of bureaucratic claims processing.170 In part because, as scholars and 
lawyers, each of us has had experience with mass litigation and routinized 
claiming,171 we regard it as a real contribution for Robinette to pose the challenge 
of figuring out how to determine when a tort claim is resolved on terms such that it 
no longer can be treated as involving recourse for a wrong. 
As Robinette notes, we resist standard professorial usage, according to which 
compensation and deterrence are identified as two of tort law’s main “purposes” or 
“functions.” We do so not because we deny that injured persons stand to receive 
compensation through filing tort claims or that companies and persons are deterred 
from incautious activity by the prospect of tort liability. Nor do we deny that the 
prospect of tort’s achieving such worthwhile consequences provides a reason for 
courts to keep their doors open to tort claimants and for legislatures to refrain from 
engaging in defendant-friendly tort reform. Instead, we resist in part because the 
identification of compensation and deterrence as “purposes” of tort law goes hand-
in-hand with a general approach to understanding tort law—instrumentalism—that 
we find woefully deficient. 
Overwhelmingly, instrumentalism, whether practiced by progressives or 
conservatives, is reductive. Its practitioners work backward from function to 
concepts, treating the latter as meaning only what they need to mean in order for 
tort to serve its assigned purposes. Yet even if non-reductive forms of 
instrumentalism are tenable, there is a larger problem in the instrumentalist’s 
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identification of compensation and deterrence as purposes of tort. According to the 
instrumentalist, the question of whether a plaintiff has a right to recover in tort from 
a defendant is necessarily a matter of whether the provision of such a right will 
advance the goals of compensation and deterrence to a sufficient degree in light of 
the costs of imposing liability. A plaintiff’s right to recover, and a defendant’s 
liability, are understood to be justified as means to reaching social goods. This is 
presumably why, as we noted above, Judge Calabresi can bring himself to describe 
Lauer v. City of New York as a “great” decision notwithstanding the court’s denial 
of the victim’s compelling claim to have been injuriously wronged.172 Its 
“greatness” (as he sees it) resides in the court’s having focused on the correct 
issue—the issue of whether liability would really deter and whether it would do so 
in a cost-effective manner. While there are areas of law that are perhaps best 
understood on such a model—antitrust law might be one—we have argued that tort 
law is not. Tort is a law of civil recourse, not a scheme for achieving compensation 
and deterrence. 
Robinette contends that, in light of the extent to which the processing of tort 
claims is routinized, we cannot claim that civil recourse theory provides anything 
close to an accurate depiction of tort law. If claims arising out of car accidents 
caused by carelessness are processed by and between insurers, with barely any 
involvement by injurer and victim, and typically result in the issuance of a check 
paid by the injurer’s insurer directly to, say, the providers of the victim’s medical 
care, or the repairer of the victim’s vehicle, then we are not entitled to count these 
cases as instances of wrongs and recourse. They are instead instances of 
compensation. 
This contention overreaches. If a restaurant patron were to describe some of the 
items on a particular restaurant’s menu, or the type of cuisine on offer, the patron 
might be providing a highly incomplete description of the restaurant. One might 
also want to know, for example, about prices, ambience, and location, and about 
how well-established it is, how well-rated it is, and so on. Though incomplete in all 
of these respects, the patron’s description of the restaurant is not “false.” As the 
endless parade of footnotes contained in this response attests, we have probably 
done far better with respect to tort than our fictional restaurant patron. Still, our 
scholarship has left some significant aspects of tort law largely untouched. One of 
them is the world of routinized claims. This by itself does not render false anything 
in the account of tort law we have offered. 
One might, however, put a somewhat different spin on Robinette’s critique. Like 
Issacharoff and Witt before him,173 he seems puzzled how scholars who spend so 
much time on torts could fail so spectacularly to see where the action really is. To 
stick with food metaphors, it is as if one encountered a writer of a food column who 
devotes all of his professional time to writing about truffles when he should be 
writing about the obesity epidemic currently plaguing American society. 
For any number of reasons, this imagined critique (our own, of course) is also 
wrongheaded. Put aside the fact that our work has not focused on exotic or arcane 
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features of tort: we write about burgers and fries, not truffles. The larger point is 
that the world of routinized tort claims—unlike, for example, the world of disaster 
relief programs in areas ravaged by storms—is legally connected to the aspects of 
tort law about which we have written. When we say, as we do, that routinized 
claims occur in the shadow of tort law, we are not only making a claim about the 
impact of tort doctrine on the conduct of insurance adjusters, but also an analytical 
claim about the legal relation between them. Robinette is entirely right that there is 
a complex world of practices to be understood that analysis of tort doctrine will not 
yield. But there is also a complex world of tort doctrine that empirical scholarship 
on the resolution of claims will not yield. It may be that many disputes governed by 
a negligence standard are resolved without a judgment as to who was at fault, or 
even without much overt attention to the issue of fault. But the settlement process 
itself obviously presupposes a law in which one who wrongfully injures another is 
potentially liable to that other. 
The “shadow” cast by tort law on routinized claim resolution is in some respects 
even more pronounced than the foregoing comments suggest. Robinette argues that 
lawyers and insurers have left tort law behind by relying on presumptions and 
procedures that enable them, in the name of efficiency, to sidestep nuanced, fact-
intensive judgments about fault and damages in resolving disputes.174 Yet he 
magnifies the distance between these practices and tort law by drawing a pair of 
overstated contrasts: (1) liability based on fault (associated with tort) versus strict 
liability (associated with compensation systems), and (2) individualized damages 
(associated with tort) versus scheduled damages (associated with compensation 
systems).175 We have emphasized that torts are legal wrongs rather than moral 
wrongs in part to demonstrate that it is a mistake to think of negligence liability as 
resting on a notion of full-blooded culpability and equally a mistake to suppose that 
there is no notion of wrongdoing at work in many forms of “strict” tort liability.176 
And, unlike many other tort theorists, we do not treat “making whole” as an 
essential feature of tort.177 Routinized payments made in reliance on presumptions 
of fault (for example, a presumption that any driver who strikes another driver’s car 
from the rear is the one who is “at fault”) are thus in our view not so far removed 
from the imposition of tort liability imposed in P v. D litigation. The same can be 
said of payments that do not track the full value of the victim’s losses and instead 
more closely hew to insurance coverage limits, particularly when made in response 
to accidents that involve less culpable wrongdoing and minor damage. Modern 
claims-resolution processes are not entirely different beasts from tort law. Indeed, 
they are in many respects but a shadow of tort law’s traditional self. One, therefore, 
needs a nuanced understanding of tort law to grasp why these systems operate in 
the way that they do. 
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Ultimately, we perceive a major point of consensus between ourselves and 
Robinette. Civil recourse theory is sometimes viewed as romanticizing tort law as a 
domain in which a victim can come to court and, through the state, hold the injurer 
accountable. This picture has an egalitarian appeal and also sounds in the idea of 
dynamic justice. We ourselves have sometimes evoked this image and will 
probably continue to do so. Robinette is concerned that the picture is misleading in 
light of what happens with the overwhelming majority of tort claims. He is right to 
be concerned. Moreover, he is right to recognize that our legal system, whether 
deliberately or through acquiescence, has permitted the overwhelming numerical 
majority of tort claims to be processed in a more bureaucratic manner. Finally, he is 
right to raise the following normative and analytical question: When, and for which 
sorts of claims, should our legal system encourage or embrace a drift toward the 
more bureaucratic mode, and when should it make an effort to preserve the ethos of 
tort claim as recourse for having been wronged? 
Yet Robinette’s framing of this key question counts in favor of civil recourse 
theory, not against it. We do not have an answer to the question, but we do bring to 
the table a basic tool for answering it. One cannot even perceive or accurately 
describe the bureaucratization of tort unless one has a complex and detailed account 
of what the character and structure of a tort claim is. Moreover, it is precisely when 
one recognizes a tort claim as a private legal power to demand redress from one 
who has wrongfully injured another—a characterization derived from civil recourse 
theory—that the question of when and why individuals choose to exercise this 
power comes to the fore. A principal point of emphasis in civil recourse theory is 
that tort law, like other branches of private law, connects wrongdoing to the 
conferral on victims of a responsive power that is exercised at the discretion of the 
victim. In doing so, it raises rather than avoids or obscures the following basic 
question: Are there recurring instances in which victims of wrongs knowingly favor 
a scheme that affords them speedier, less fulsome compensation at the loss of some 
of the satisfaction that might come from a more elaborate inquiry into 
responsibility and a more substantial damages award? Just by inviting this 
distinction, civil recourse theory may help point toward an answer to the normative 
question that Robinette has powerfully articulated. 
CONCLUSION 
Calabresi, Chamallas, Posner, Robinette, and Rustad come at our work from 
different perspectives, and emphasize different perceived deficiencies in it. But 
they share a common complaint. All claim that our approach suffers from being 
academic and moralistic in the pejorative senses of those terms. Ours, they say, is 
an effort to isolate tort as a pure moral form divorced from and blind to hard 
realities, including the reality that law is an instrument for the attainment of certain 
goals, the reality that law changes in response to changing conditions, the reality 
that law can be an agent of injustice, and the reality of how civil justice actually 
works. These complaints in turn rely on a set of dogmas that tend to fall under the 
heading of “legal realism” and that, unfortunately, pervade the modern legal 
academy. 
Our work in tort law is self-consciously premised on a rejection of realist 
dogma, and indeed it is offered as evidence against it. It maintains that one can take 
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seriously tort law’s morally rich language of duty and right without embracing the 
notion that practical and consequentialist considerations have no relevance to 
determinations of legal liability. It takes the view that tort law’s doctrines are 
capacious enough to accommodate social, economic, political, and intellectual 
change without thereby being rendered vacuous, and that judges have the power 
and responsibility to develop common law in light of these changes. It recognizes 
that, while tort law’s scheme of powers and liabilities can promote justice, it can 
also promote injustice, and that often there is simply nothing worth saying about 
whether a tort judgment has effected justice or injustice. It acknowledges that tort 
law is operationalized in part through other bodies of law, including the law of civil 
procedure, and other institutions, including insurance, yet denies that tort law 
somehow dissolves into these other laws and institutions, leaving only them as 
worthy objects of study. 
We do not suppose that our work is any more immune from serious criticism 
than other legal scholarship. As grateful as we are to have this occasion to engage 
our critics, we find few such criticisms leveled against us here. We do not need to 
be told that our work departs from realist orthodoxies. We have not only argued 
against these orthodoxies at a philosophical level, we have engaged in concrete, 
ground-level legal analysis that demonstrates their falsity. We will continue to 
develop our view that torts are a special class of wrongs, that tort law is a law of 
civil recourse, that common law adjudication can and should be conceptual and 
pragmatic, and that law can and should be approached in the first instance through 
the lens of a jurisprudence of pragmatic conceptualism. We hope that we will 
continue to be rewarded by the attention of critics at every turn. 
 
  
